Environmental options and technological innovation: an evolutionary game model
This paper analyzes the effects on economic agents’ behaviour of an innovative environmental protection mechanism that the Public Administration of a tourist region may adopt to attract visitors while protecting the environment. On the one hand, the Public Administration sells to the tourists an environmental call option that gives them the possibility of being (partially or totally) reimbursed if the environmental quality in the region turns out to be unsatisfactory (i.e. below a given threshold level). On the other hand, it offers the firms that adopt an innovative, non-polluting technology an environmental put option that allows them to get a reimbursement for the additional costs imposed by the new technology if the environmental quality is sufficiently good (i.e. above the threshold level).The aim of the paper is to study the dynamics that arises with this financial mechanism from the interaction between the economic agents and the Public Administration in an evolutionary game context.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2009|
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- Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, September.
- Perrings,Charles, 1987. "Economy and Environment," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521340816.
- Costanza, Robert & Perrings, Charles, 1990. "A flexible assurance bonding system for improved environmental management," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 57-75, April.
- Perrings, Charles, 1989. "Environmental bonds and environmental research in innovative activities," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 95-110, February.
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