Evolutionary Norm Enforcement
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- Werner Gueth & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "Evolutionary Norm Enforcement," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 156(2), pages 335-335, June.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Axel Ockenfels, 2009.
"Marktdesign und Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung,"
Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik,
Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 10(s1), pages 31-53, May.
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- Werner Güth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "The Coevolution of Trust and Institutions in Anonymous and Non-anonymous Communities," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-07, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
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"The coevolution of morality and legal institutions: an indirect evolutionary approach,"
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More about this item
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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