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Trustworthiness and economic performance

  • Breuer, Janice Boucher
  • McDermott, John

Intrinsically trustworthy agents never cheat. A society's willingness to trust and the quality of its institutions have their origins in the intrinsic trustworthiness of its citizens. Trustworthiness is the basis for maximizing output in economic exchange and in explaining differences in standards of living around the world. We measure intrinsic trustworthiness with a question from the World Values Survey and estimate its effect using a sample of 60 countries. We find that trustworthiness is important for output per capita and that the effect of trust is likely to come from trustworthiness.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 16777.

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Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:16777
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