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La nouvelle organisation ferroviaire britannique : sur la frontière entre intégration et désintégration

  • Hakam Kamleh

    (CERGAM-CAE, Aix-Marseille Université)

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    Le déclin des transports ferrés européens après la seconde guerre mondiale a été marqué par une dégradation de la qualité du service et un fort déficit des monopoles publics verticalement intégrés. La déréglementation des chemins de fer est alors apparue comme la solution à ce double problème aux Etats-Unis, au Japon, au Canada et en Suède (respectivement en 1980, 1985, 1987 et 1988). Le 29 juillet 1991, la directive communautaire 91/440/CEE est venue exiger la libéralisation de l’accès des opérateurs exploitants aux réseaux ferrés. Ces évènements, combinés aux changements dans l’environnement institutionnel européen, ont ainsi conduit à la remise en cause définitive du modèle du monopole public du transport ferroviaire ; ils ont impulsé la réforme ferroviaire britannique de 1993. Alors que la plupart des réformes ont relativement bien réussi, la réforme britannique s’est heurtée à plusieurs obstacles : principalement le manque de sécurité et le déficit financier du nouvel organisme chargé de gérer l’infrastructure, Railtrack. Comment expliquer cet échec ? Comment résoudre les problèmes rencontrés ? Notre recherche consiste à tirer les leçons de l’expérience britannique et à essayer de proposer des solutions à l’aide des outils analytiques fournis par la théorie des contrats. Nous ferons plus particulièrement appel aux travaux de Demsetz [1968] sur le contrat de « franchise bidding », à la théorie des coûts de transaction de Williamson [1976, 1985], à la théorie des contrats incomplets de Hart & Moore [1986, 1988], et à la théorie des contrats à durée endogène de Engel, Fischer et Galetovic [1997]. Ces outils analytiques nous fournirons un cadre pertinent d’appréciation des modes alternatifs de coordination des services ferroviaires, puis nous permettrons d’évaluer l’efficacité des arrangements contractuels issus de la réforme britannique. Notre but est à terme de dégager une structure de gouvernance des institutions ferroviaires susceptible de permettre l’amélioration de la qualité du service fourni aux clients.

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    File URL: http://junon.u-3mrs.fr/afa10w21/RePEc/cgm/wpaper/DR_28_0506_kamleh.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2005
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    Paper provided by Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM in its series CAE Working Papers with number 28.

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    Length: 16 pages
    Date of creation: 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:cgm:wpaper:28
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