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L’approche contractuelle du concept de gouvernance

  • Darine Bakkour

Le présent papier vise à expliciter les fondements théoriques du concept de gouvernance. Nous soulignons, tout d’abord, la théorie de l’agence de Jensen et Meckling (1976) qui concerne toute relation entre mandataire et mandant. Ainsi, au niveau d’un État, il s’agit de la relation entre le peuple (mandant) et l’élu du peuple (mandataire). Ensuite, nous distinguons trois cadres conceptuels dans le champ de l’économie des contrats, i.e. la théorie des incitations (TI), la théorie des contrats incomplets (TCI) et la théorie des coûts de transactions (TCT), qui fournissent des éclaircissements sur le concept de gouvernance d’un système.

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File URL: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/ES2013-04.pdf
File Function: First version, 2013
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Paper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Studies and Syntheses with number 13-04.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2013
Date of revision: Dec 2013
Handle: RePEc:lam:estudy:13-04
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Web page: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/

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  1. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "Contract and Economic Organization," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 55-66.
  3. Coase, Ronald, 1998. "The New Institutional Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 72-74, May.
  4. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
  5. Gérard Charreaux, 2001. "Quelle théorie pour la gouvernance?De la gouvernance actionnariale à la gouvernance cognitive..," Working Papers CREGO 010401, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations, revised Feb 2002.
  6. Stéphane Saussier & M'Hand Farès, 2002. "Coûts de transaction et contrats incomplets," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(3), pages 193-230.
  7. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-49, June.
  8. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
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