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La governance delle universita' italiane dopo la Riforma Gelmini: un'indagine empirica sui processi decisionali

Author

Listed:
  • Carla Facchini

    (Dipartimento di Economia e Management, Università di Trento)

  • Lorenzo Sacconi

    (University of Trento)

  • Magalì Fia

    (Dipartimento di ingegneria gestionale, Politecnico di Milano)

Abstract

In the last decades, the political and academic discussion on university governance has been characterized by two different perspectives. On one hand, the New Public Management approach, in which universities are seen as institutions in a quasi-market in which political authority appoints external agents and imposes incentive to align to its goals the interests of the universities and of those who work there. On the other hand, a perspective in which universities are understood as publicly regulated institutions, whose main aim is the cooperation between the stakeholders that sustains the fundamental relationships between different university components and the investments in human capital . In this context, we study the reform introduced in Italy by the Law 30 December 2010, n 240 that redesigned the governance of Italian universities. We use an unique dataset on Italian universities to investigate, beyond the letter of the law (and statutes), the internal governance patterns that emerged after the reform. The results show that, even in the presence of a common regulatory framework, a variety of governance models have been implemented by the universities. Such models ranges in a continuum between a vertical and a shared governance model. Furthermore, the data confirm the hypothesis that in many (even if not all) of the universities the stakeholders who hold the essential cognitive resources and the specific investments in the university, respond so as to introduce functional balances that prevent opportunistic behaviors that would otherwise expropriate their investments. Negli ultimi decenni, la discussione sui meccanismi e i modelli di governo delle università è caratterizzata sul piano politico e su quello scientifico da due visioni di fondo profondamente diverse. Da un lato, la visione del New Public Management (NPM) , in cui le università sono viste come istituzioni che operano in un quasi-mercato in cui l’autorità politica svolge il suo ruolo attraverso la nomina di amministratori esterni e impone meccanismi di incentivo volti ad allineare gli interessi delle università e di chi vi opera (gli agenti) a obiettivi prefissati. Dall’altro, una visione che guarda alle università in una logica di autonomia e insieme di responsabilità sociale verso i suoi diversi stakeholder interni ed esterni. In questa prospettiva, le università sono intese come istituzioni pubbliche finanziate e regolate nei loro obiettivi generali dallo Stato ma autonome e auto-governate, il cui problema principale è la cooperazione tra gli stakeholder essenziali e la accountability verso gli stakeholder esterni. In questo quadro si inserisce la riforma introdotta in Italia con la legge 30 Dicembre 2010, n 240. Nonostante l’iniziale ispirazione all’approccio NPM, tuttavia, l’assetto di governo alla fine risultante dalla legge e dagli statuti approvati non introduce in modo effettivo il controllo esterno tipico del NPM, ma nemmeno si rifà al modello di governance condivisa di tipo multi-stakeholder. Risulta quindi importante per cogliere i mutamenti in corso, l’analisi delle prassi di governance in atto nelle Università e delle concrete dinamiche. Solo con questa analisi si può infatti verificare l’effettivo impatto che la normativa ha avuto, ed, eventualmente, i fattori che, pur in presenza di un quadro normativo prefissato, hanno comportato una diversa implementazione di tale nuovo modello di governance. In questo articolo, sulla base di ipotesi ricavate dalla ricostruzione a grandi linee del dibattito teorico, intendiamo indagare gli effettivi modelli decisionali in atto nelle Università italiane, utilizzando i principali risultati di un’indagine sulla governance delle università nel post-riforma. L’indagine, condotta nel 2015 è stata svolta attraverso questionari on-line somministrati a tutti i Rettori e Direttori di dipartimento delle università italiane, con un elevato tasso di risposta (quasi il 40%) che rende i risultati decisamente significativi e rilevanti, data l’estrema articolazione dei questionari e, quindi la ricchezza dei dati raccolti. Nell’articolo presentiamo i dati relativi ai modelli decisionali a livello di ateneo, il peso dei diversi stakeholder nel processo decisionale relativamente ad una pluralità di ambiti di intervento (dal bilancio, alla ripartizione dei fondi di ricerca, alla gestione del personale) e le valutazioni che i Direttori danno del mutamento in atto. I risultati mostrano, che di fronte allo shock esogeno della riforma, nelle università si forma una pluralità di modelli di governance che variano in un continuum tra un modello verticale e un modello bilanciato. Inoltre, i dati confermano l’ipotesi che in molti (anche se non tutti) atenei gli agenti che detengono le risorse cognitive essenziali e gli investimenti specifici nell’università, rispondono, in base alla loro forza strategica, mediante adattamenti degli effettivi meccanismi di governance, in modo da reintrodurre bilanciamenti funzionali a prevenire i comportamenti opportunistici (tra cui l’abuso di autorità) che li esproprierebbero.

Suggested Citation

  • Carla Facchini & Lorenzo Sacconi & Magalì Fia, 2019. "La governance delle universita' italiane dopo la Riforma Gelmini: un'indagine empirica sui processi decisionali," Econometica Working Papers wp68, Econometica.
  • Handle: RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp68
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Governance universitaria; New Public Management; Riforma universitaria italiana; bilanciamento dei poteri.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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