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Quels enjeux théoriques et méthodologiques de la théorie de la gouvernance partenariale ? La privatisation comme illustration

Author

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  • Céline Chatelin

    (Laboratoire Orléanais de Gestion)

Abstract

Une revue des arguments théoriques et des résultats empiriques sur la relation particulière privatisation-performance montre que l’hypothèse d’accroissement de performance induit par la privatisation est encore très controversée. Nous développons une approche partenariale de la théorie de la gouvernance et démontrons sa portée explicative dans la compréhension de la dynamique organisationnelle sous-jacente à la privatisation. En retour, nous statuons sur les perspectives de développement de cet axe de la théorie de l’architecture organisationnelle, afin d’approfondir notre compréhension de la dynamique organisationnelle dans son acception la plus large. Cette recherche s’appuie sur une enquête qualitative menée par le biais d’entretiens auprès de responsables financiers de 8 clubs professionnels de 5 sports collectifs. Elle s’intéresse à la fois à ce que font et disent les responsables. Elle aboutit à des logiques explicatives du type de contrôle dans les organisations en fonction des pressions de l’environnement. On constate que ce sont les clubs évoluant dans les disciplines sportives les moins médiatisées qui subissent les plus fortes pressions de l’environnement institutionnel, conduisant à un contrôle de conformité. A l’opposé les clubs évoluant dans les disciplines sportives les plus médiatisées ont mis en place un véritable contrôle d’opportunité (sur le triptyque objectifs/moyens/résultats). Entre ces deux logiques il existe des clubs en situation d’apprentissage pour lesquels la gouvernance institutionnelle constitue un formidable levier.

Suggested Citation

  • Céline Chatelin, 2002. "Quels enjeux théoriques et méthodologiques de la théorie de la gouvernance partenariale ? La privatisation comme illustration," Working Papers 2002-5, Laboratoire Orléanais de Gestion - université d'Orléans.
    • Handle: RePEc:log:wpaper:2002-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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