IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wdi/papers/2003-569.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

How Important is Ownership in a Market with Level Playing Field? The Indian Banking Sector Revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Sumon Kumar Bhaumik

    ()

  • Ralitza Dimova

    ()

Abstract

It has long been argued that private ownership of firms leads to better firm performance. However, theory as well as empirical evidence suggest that factors like agency problems may not allow privately owned firms to operate more efficiently or perform better that state owned firms. At the same time, it has been argued that competition and hard budget constraints can induce state owned firms to operate efficiently. In India, banking sector reforms were initiated in 1992-93, leading to entry and other forms of deregulation, and a level playing field for all banks. Data for 1995-96 through 2000-01 suggest that by 1999- 00 ownership was no longer a significant determinant of performance; induced by competition, public sector banks were able to eliminate the performance/efficiency gap that existed between them and domestic private sector and foreign banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Sumon Kumar Bhaumik & Ralitza Dimova, 2003. "How Important is Ownership in a Market with Level Playing Field? The Indian Banking Sector Revisited," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-569, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  • Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-569
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39955/3/wp569.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Berger, Allen N. & Mester, Loretta J., 2003. "Explaining the dramatic changes in performance of US banks: technological change, deregulation, and dynamic changes in competition," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 57-95, January.
    2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    3. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1990. " Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 31-48, March.
    4. Akhigbe, Aigbe & McNulty, James E., 2003. "The profit efficiency of small US commercial banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 307-325, February.
    5. Bilsen, Valentijn & Konings, Jozef, 1998. "Job Creation, Job Destruction, and Growth of Newly Established, Privatized, and State-Owned Enterprises in Transition Economies: Survey Evidence from Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 429-445, September.
    6. Ehrlich, Isaac & Georges Gallais-Hamonno & Zhiqiang Liu & Randall Lutter, 1994. "Productivity Growth and Firm Ownership: An Analytical and Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 1006-1038, October.
    7. Sjostrom, Tomas & Weitzman, Martin L., 1996. "Competition and the evolution of efficiency," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 25-43, July.
    8. Isik, Ihsan & Kabir Hassan, M., 2003. "Financial deregulation and total factor productivity change: An empirical study of Turkish commercial banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(8), pages 1455-1485, August.
    9. Estrin, Saul & Perotin, Virginie, 1991. "Does ownership always matter?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 55-72, March.
    10. Januszewski, Silke I. & Koke, Jens & Winter, Joachim K., 2002. "Product market competition, corporate governance and firm performance: an empirical analysis for Germany," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 299-332, September.
    11. Goldberg, Lawrence G. & White, Lawrence J., 1998. "De novo banks and lending to small businesses: An empirical analysis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 851-867, August.
    12. Caves, Douglas W & Christensen, Laurits R, 1980. "The Relative Efficiency of Public and Private Firms in a Competitive Environment: The Case of Canadian Railroads," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(5), pages 958-976, October.
    13. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April.
    14. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    15. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
    16. repec:lmu:muenar:19529 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    18. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    19. Minh To, Huong & Tripe, David, 2002. "Factors influencing the performance of foreign-owned banks in New Zealand," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 12(4-5), pages 341-357.
    20. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025.
    21. Agrawal, Anup & Jaffe, Jeffrey F & Mandelker, Gershon N, 1992. " The Post-merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1605-1621, September.
    22. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    23. Jacobsson, Staffan, 1991. "Government policy and performance of the Indian engineering industry," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 45-56, February.
    24. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 110-110.
    25. Canhoto, Ana & Dermine, Jean, 2003. "A note on banking efficiency in Portugal, New vs. Old banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(11), pages 2087-2098, November.
    26. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    27. Brown, J David & Earle, John S, 2000. "Competition And Firm Performance: Lessons From Russia," CEPR Discussion Papers 2444, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    28. Ravenscraft, David J & Scherer, F M, 1987. "Life after Takeover," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 147-156, December.
    29. Levy, Brian, 1987. "A theory of public enterprise behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 75-96, March.
    30. Barajas, Adolfo & Steiner, Roberto & Salazar, Natalia, 2000. "The impact of liberalization and foreign investment in Colombia's financial sector," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 157-196, October.
    31. Konings, Jozef, 1997. "Firm growth and ownership in transition countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 413-418, September.
    32. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 351-351.
    33. John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1988. "Privatization: An Economic Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262720116, January.
    34. Sarkar, Jayati & Sarkar, Subrata & Bhaumik, Sumon K., 1998. "Does Ownership Always Matter?--Evidence from the Indian Banking Industry," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 262-281, June.
    35. Gorton, Gary & Schmid, Frank, 1999. "Corporate governance, ownership dispersion and efficiency: Empirical evidence from Austrian cooperative banking," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 119-140, June.
    36. repec:hrv:faseco:30727607 is not listed on IDEAS
    37. Asquith, K Paul & Kim, E Han, 1982. " The Impact of Merger Bids on the Participating Firms' Security Holders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(5), pages 1209-1228, December.
    38. Arshadi, Nasser & Lawrence, Edward C., 1987. "An empirical investigation of new bank performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 33-48, March.
    39. Bhaumik, Sumon Kumar & Nugent, Jeffrey B, 1999. "Analysis of Food Demand in Peru: Implications for Food-Feed Competition," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 242-257, October.
    40. Cavallo, Laura & Rossi, Stefania P. S., 2001. "Scale and scope economies in the European banking systems," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 11(4-5), pages 515-531, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking sector reforms; performance; competition; ownership; convergence;

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-569. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (WDI). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/wdumius.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.