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Product market competition, corporate governance and firm performance: an empirical analysis for Germany

  • Januszewski, Silke I.
  • Koke, Jens
  • Winter, Joachim K.

This study examines the impact of product market competition and corporate governance on productivity growth in German manufacturing. Using a panel of almost 500 firms over the years 1986 to 1994, we find that firms experience higher productivity growth when operating in markets with intense competition. Similarly, productivity growth is higher for firms under control of a strong ultimate owner, but not when the ultimate owner is a financial institution (a group that consisted almost exclusively of German banks and insurance firms in our sample period). Our results also indicate that competition and tight control are complements: The positive effect of competition is enhanced by the presence of a strong ultimate owner.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in Economics.

Volume (Year): 56 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 299-332

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Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:56:y:2002:i:3:p:299-332
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