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Governance Structures, Efficiency, and Firm Profitability

  • Erik Lehmann

    ()

  • Jürgen Weigand
  • Susanne Warning

Using a panel data set of 361 German corporations for the period 1991 to 1996 we test the hypothesis that firms with more efficient governance structures have higher profitability. To determine efficiency we compare firms with respect to ownership concentration, the identity of owners, capital structure, investment and firm growth by a multi-input/multi-output Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This non -parametric linear programming technique considers both multiple in- and outputs. Based on the concept of pareto efficiency, it computes an efficiency score where the associated weights of the inputs and outputs are determined endogenously. The DEA efficiency scores are then used as explanatory variables in panel data regressions of profitability. Our main finding is that the efficiency scores indeed contribute significantly to explaining profitability differences between firms, even after controlling for industry effects and unobserved systematic firm effects.

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Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy Group in its series Papers on Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy with number 2004-22.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: May 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:esi:egpdis:2004-22
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