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How Ownership Structure Affects Capital Structure and Firm Performance? Recent Evidence from East Asia

Author

Listed:
  • Nigel Driffield

    (Aston Business School)

  • Vidya Mahambare

    (Cardiff Business School)

  • Sarmistha Pal

    (Department of Economics & Finance, Brunel University)

Abstract

Despite the seminal work of Claessens et al. (2002), role of ownership structure on capital structure and firm performance in East Asian corporattions remains much unexplored. Within the framework of Bajaj et al. (1998), the present paper empirically examines the effects of a controlling manager and degree of monitoring (a measure of moral hazard) on capital structure and firm performance among a sample of Korean and Indonesian firms. In doing so, we not only allow for simultaneity between capital structure and firm performance (a la Berger and di Patti, 2003), but also the non-linearity in these relationships. Our empirical results in essence depend on whether a firm is run by a family and also whether there is a manager who is also a controlling owner. There is evidence that family ownership could mitigate the problem of moral hazard though it could exacerbate the problem of over-lending in our samples. Also the effects of ownership structure on firm performance cannot be delineated from its effects on leverage. As such, the results presented here confirm and extend the essential findings of Claessens et al. (2002) and Bajaj et al. (1998).

Suggested Citation

  • Nigel Driffield & Vidya Mahambare & Sarmistha Pal, 2005. "How Ownership Structure Affects Capital Structure and Firm Performance? Recent Evidence from East Asia," Finance 0509028, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0509028
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    Cited by:

    1. Nhung Hong LE, 2017. "The impact of family ownership status on determinants of leverage. Empirical evidence from South East Asia," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2017-09, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    2. Jayati Sarkar & Subrata Sarkar, 2005. "Debt and corporate governance in emerging economies: Evidence from India," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2005-007, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    3. Luigi Lepore & Francesco Paolone & Domenico Rocco Cambrea, 2018. "Ownership structure, investors’ protection and corporate valuation: the effect of judicial system efficiency in family and non-family firms," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(4), pages 829-862, December.
    4. Nigel Driffield & Sarmistha Pal, 2010. "Evolution of capital structure in east Asia—corporate inertia or endeavours?," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 173(1), pages 1-29, January.
    5. Coricelli, Fabrizio & Driffield, Nigel & Pal, Sarmistha & Roland, Isabelle, 2012. "When does leverage hurt productivity growth? A firm-level analysis," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 1674-1694.
    6. Leandro Medina, 2012. "Spring Forward or Fall Back? The Post-Crisis Recovery of Firms," IMF Working Papers 2012/292, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Godfred A. Bokpin & Anastacia C. Arko, 2009. "Ownership structure, corporate governance and capital structure decisions of firms," Studies in Economics and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 26(4), pages 246-256, October.
    8. NAKABAYASHI, Masaki, 2016. "Self-fulfilling Distortion and Ownership Structure: Market Discipline and Owner fs Dominance at the Dawn of the Japanese Capitalism," ISS Discussion Paper Series (series F) f181, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, revised 05 Feb 2018.
    9. Jayati Sarkar & Subrata Sarkar, 2008. "Debt and corporate governance in emerging economies Evidence from India1," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 16(2), pages 293-334, April.
    10. Irene Wei Kiong Ting & Hooi Hooi Lean & Qian Long Kweh & Noor Azlinna Azizan, 2016. "Managerial overconfidence, government intervention and corporate financing decision," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 12(1), pages 4-24, February.
    11. Ashraf, Dawood & Rizwan, Muhammad Suhail & Azmat, Saad, 2018. "The Role of Ownership and Governance Mechanism in Sukuk Financing by Malaysian Firms: An Application of A Double Selection Model," Working Papers 2018-2, The Islamic Research and Teaching Institute (IRTI).
    12. Hayam Wahba, 2014. "Capital structure, managerial ownership and firm performance: evidence from Egypt," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(4), pages 1041-1061, November.
    13. Apalak Khatua, 2017. "Does business group affiliation matter for external debt finance? Evidence from India," Asian Business & Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 16(4), pages 290-322, December.
    14. Prasetyantoko, Agustinus, 2008. "Financing Policies and Firm Vulnerability in Indonesia," MPRA Paper 6533, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Su-Lien Lu & Ying-Hui Li, 2019. "Effect of Corporate Governance on Institutional Investors’ Preferences: An Empirical Investigation in Taiwan," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-21, February.
    16. Soon Suk Yoon & Hyo Jin Kim & Hongbok Lee & Doug Waggle, 2017. "Financing preferences: evidence from the Korean market," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(44), pages 4501-4520, September.
    17. Vivake Anand & Kamran Ahmed Soomro & Suneel Kumar Solanki, 2016. "Determinants of Credit Rating and Optimal Capital Structure among Pakistani Banks," Romanian Economic Journal, Department of International Business and Economics from the Academy of Economic Studies Bucharest, vol. 19(60), pages 169-182, June.
    18. Demid Chernenko, 2019. "Capital structure and oligarch ownership," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 383-411, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asian Crisis; Corporate Governance; Capital structure; Firm performance; Expropriation of minority shareholders; 3SLS estimates; Simultaneity bias; Non-linearity.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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