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Is the German system of corporate governance converging towards the Anglo-American model?

  • Marc Goergen
  • Miguel Manjon
  • Luc Renneboog

    ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10997-007-9040-7
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Management & Governance.

Volume (Year): 12 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 37-71

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:12:y:2008:i:1:p:37-71
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102940

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