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An Empirical Analysis of the 2000 Corporate Tax Reform in Germany: Effects on Ownership and Control in Listed Companies

  • Weber, A.

This paper is a first attempt to analyse the implications of the 2000 corporate tax reform on ownership concentration in Germany. The empirical results document a fall in ownership concentration and a decrease in the power of top institutional owners including the big banks. The description of German corporate governance as a bank-based system may hence no longer apply. However, contrary to what was expected by proponents of the reform, the corporate tax reform did not revolutionise German corporate governance. Ownership concentration in 2005 is still high compared to the Anglo-American economies and an active market for corporate control is not observed.

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File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe0556.pdf
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Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0556.

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Length: 21
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0556
Note: IO
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm

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  1. Marco Becht, 1999. "European corporate governance: trading off liquidity against control," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13314, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  2. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  4. Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Discussion Paper 2004-123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Deeg, Richard, 2001. "Institutional change and the uses and limits of path dependency: The case of German finance," MPIfG Discussion Paper 01/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
  6. Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, 2009. "When No Law is Better Than a Good Law," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 13(4), pages 577-627.
  7. Höpner, Martin, 2001. "Corporate governance in transition: Ten empirical findings on shareholder value and industrial relations in Germany," MPIfG Discussion Paper 01/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
  8. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1840, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  9. Andreas Hackethal & Reinhard H. Schmidt & Marcel Tyrell, 2005. "Banks and German Corporate Governance: on the way to a capital market-based system?," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 397-407, 05.
  10. Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, 2001. "Ownership and Control of German Corporations," OFRC Working Papers Series 2001fe11, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
  11. Jonathan Story & Ingo Walter, 1997. "Political Economy of Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle of the Systems," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262692031, June.
  12. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
  13. Becht, Marco & Boehmer, Ekkehart, 2003. "Voting control in German corporations," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-29, March.
  14. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521566087 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Michael Keen, 2002. "The German Tax Reform of 2000," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(5), pages 603-621, September.
  16. Marco Becht & Fabrizio Barca, 2001. "The control of corporate Europe," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13302, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  17. Marco Becht & Ekkehart Boehmer, 2001. "Ownership and voting power in Germany," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13334, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  18. Dariusz W�jcik, 2003. "Change in the German model of corporate governance: evidence from blockholdings 1997 - 2001," Environment and Planning A, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 35(8), pages 1431-1458, August.
  19. Jeremy Edwards & Marcus Nibler, 2000. "Corporate governance in Germany: the role of banks and ownership concentration," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 15(31), pages 237-267, October.
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