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The impracticality of an international “one size fits all” corporate governance code of best practice

Author

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  • Marlene Davies
  • Bernadette Schlitzer

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to review corporate governance literature from an international perspective in terms of having a global code of corporate governance. Design/methodology/approach - Using a wide ranging literature review, the paper looks at the issue of a global corporate governance code of best practice from legal, corporate ownership structure and financial systems perspectives and the consequent/divergence issues that arise. Findings - The paper supports the hypothesis that the “one size fits all” approach to corporate governance, particularly the Anglo Saxon model, is not necessarily the right approach from a global perspective. Convergence on fundamental features of shareholder protection, independence of directors and establishment of committees may be the preferred way forward. Practical implications - The acceptance of a global corporate governance code is limited due to the adaptations in the business environment, investor confidence and corporate successes and failures. Originality/value - The analysis of the framework provides an interesting paper for corporate governance researchers.

Suggested Citation

  • Marlene Davies & Bernadette Schlitzer, 2008. "The impracticality of an international “one size fits all” corporate governance code of best practice," Managerial Auditing Journal, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 23(6), pages 532-544, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:majpps:v:23:y:2008:i:6:p:532-544
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    19. repec:hrv:faseco:30747162 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Marco Becht & Fabrizio Barca, 2001. "The control of corporate Europe," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13302, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Miroslav Nedelchev, 2013. "Good Practices in Corporate Governance: One-Size-Fits-All vs. Comply-or-Explain," International Journal of Business Administration, International Journal of Business Administration, Sciedu Press, vol. 4(6), pages 75-81, November.
    2. repec:spr:manint:v:52:y:2012:i:3:d:10.1007_s11575-011-0108-x is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Emilia Tomczyk & Maria Aluchna, 2015. "Shareholder structure and compliance with the board best practice: econometric analysis," Applied Econometrics Papers, Department of Applied Econometrics, Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2(1), pages 51-75.
    4. Tariq, Yasir Bin & Abbas, Zaheer, 2013. "Compliance and multidimensional firm performance: Evaluating the efficacy of rule-based code of corporate governance," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 565-575.

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