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Block investments and the race for corporate control in Belgium

  • Ariane Chapelle

This paper investigates the common patterns of ownership structure across different corporate governance systems. We test the predictions of Zwiebel (1995) using ownership data of Belgian listed companies in 1995 and in 1999. Results show good applicability of the model. This empirical research relates to other contributions performing tests for Hungary, Poland, and Spain. Next the model and its limitations are discussed. The paper opens promising fields for research in ownership structure modeling adapted to corporate governance systems of Continental and Eastern Europe.

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Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/9943.

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Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: Corporate Ownership & Control (2004) v.2 n° 1,p.11-25
Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/9943
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
Contact details of provider: Postal:
CP135, 50, avenue F.D. Roosevelt, 1050 Bruxelles

Web page: http://difusion.ulb.ac.be

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  1. Becht, M.C. & Chapelle, A. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 1999. "Shareholding Cascades : The Separation of Ownership and Control in Belgium," Discussion Paper 1999-96, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Renneboog, Luc, 2000. "Ownership, managerial control and the governance of companies listed on the Brussels stock exchange," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(12), pages 1959-1995, December.
  3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," NBER Working Papers 5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Colin Mayer & Julian Franks, 2000. "Ownership and Control of German Corporations," Economics Series Working Papers 2001-FE-11, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Barclay, Michael J. & Holderness, Clifford G., 1989. "Private benefits from control of public corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 371-395, December.
  6. Ariane Chapelle, 2001. "Corporate governance en Belgique: l'effet des pyramides," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9933, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  7. Luc Renneboog & Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, 1999. "Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?," OFRC Working Papers Series 1999fe01, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
  8. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
  9. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1840, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  10. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Scholarly Articles 3606237, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. Luigi Zingales, 1995. "Insider Ownership and the Decision to Go Public," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(3), pages 425-448.
  12. Zingales, Luigi, 1994. "The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 125-48.
  13. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control," NBER Working Papers 2347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June.
  15. Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728.
  16. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate control contests and capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 55-86, January.
  17. Van Hulle, Cynthia, 1998. "On the nature of European holding groups," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 255-277, September.
  18. Guercio, Diane Del & Hawkins, Jennifer, 1999. "The motivation and impact of pension fund activism," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 293-340, June.
  19. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
  20. Mayer, Colin, 1997. "The City and Corporate Performance: Condemned or Exonerated?," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 291-302, March.
  21. Dewatripont, M., 1993. "The 'leading shareholder' strategy, takeover contests and stock price dynamics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 983-1004, June.
  22. Ernst Maug, 1998. "Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and Control?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 65-98, 02.
  23. Bennedsen, Morten & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2000. "The balance of power in closely held corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 113-139.
  24. Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1995. "Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(2), pages 161-185.
  25. Denis, David J. & Denis, Diane K. & Sarin, Atulya, 1997. "Ownership structure and top executive turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 193-221, August.
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