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Stakeholder Governance and Organizational Performance: Lessons from past privatizations;Gouvernance partenariale et performance organisationnelle:les enseignements des privatisations passées

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Cet article pose deux questions, l'une relative à la problématique fondamentale du lien entre propriété et performance dans le cas emblématique de la privatisation, l'autre relative à la portée explicative de la théorie de la gouvernance. En reconsidérant le débat traditionnel fondé sur le "simple" transfert de propriété au profit d'agents privés, notre réflexion relève d'une analyse des règles du jeu organisationnel qui gouvernent le processus de décision. Dans une perspective partenariale de la valeur, quid des effets de la privatisation sur le processus décisionnel et sur ses interactions avec les mécanismes de gouvernance qui sont supposés l'encadrer ? Ce renouvellement de perspective offre en retour, une opportunité de statuer sur la théorie de la gouvernance partenariale. Cet article sollicite ainsi une réflexion ouverte sur les axes de recherche de la théorie de la gouvernance dans la compréhension d'une logique continue d'adaptation de l'entreprise à son environnement. This paper asks two questions. One is related to the basic links between property and performance in the symbolic case of privatisation. The second question is related to the explanatory power of the corporate governance theory. By re-interpreting the traditional debate based on the "simple" transfer of property to private agents, we analyze the rules of the organizational game which are supposed to govern the decision process. In a stakeholder perspective of the value, what are the effects of privatisation on the decision making process and its links with governance mechanisms? This renewal is an opportunity to examine the stakeholder corporate governance theory. This paper concludes with an open discussion about the research agenda for understanding the adaptative dynamics of the organisation to its environment.

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  • Céline Chatelin, 2003. "Stakeholder Governance and Organizational Performance: Lessons from past privatizations;Gouvernance partenariale et performance organisationnelle:les enseignements des privatisations passées," Working Papers CREGO 1030102, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1030102
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    création et répartition de la valeur; étude de cas; gouvernance partenariale; privatisation; processus décisionnel; value creation and allocation; case study; stakeholder governance; privatisation; decision making process;

    JEL classification:

    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

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