Specific knowledge, investment decision and organizational architecture
Within the theoretical framework of organizational architecture, this paper attempts to explain the decentralization of investment decision. To do so, it highlights the role of the allocation of decision rights and control as a factor explaining the effectiveness of investment management. Thus, the object of this research is, first, to strengthen the relevance of the theoretical corpus of Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) and Jensen and Meckling (1992), and, secondly, to replicate the studies by Noda and Bower (1996), Fahmi (1999) and Catelin (2001) and extend them to the Tunisian context. The Tunisian example is relevant because of the lack of research on the topic for this country, and also because this research could improve decision making for investment in the current context of Tunisia. We show that the role played by organizational complexity, information and communication technology, training programs, and evaluation and incentive systems in the creation of value requires the setting of a centralized organizational structure. An empirical test was conducted on a sample of 63 Tunisian firms by using canonical analysis. This test allowed the validation of four out of the five tested hypotheses.
|Date of creation:||May 2011|
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- James A. Brickley & Clifford W. Smith & Jerold L. Zimmerman, 1997. "Management Fads And Organizational Architecture," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 10(2), pages 24-39.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/654 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ghazi Zouari, 2011. "The corporate investment decision process and control systems," International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 4(1), pages 20-53.
- Gérard Charreaux, 2004.
"Michael Jensen-la théorie positive de l’agence et ses applications à l’architecture et à la gouvernance des organisations,"
Working Papers CREGO
1041203, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
- Gérard Charreaux, 2008. "Michael Jensen - la théorie positive de l'agence et ses applications à l'architecture et à la gouvernance des organisations," Post-Print halshs-00338038, HAL.
- Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
- Park, Albert & Shen, Minggao, 2008. "Refinancing and decentralization: Evidence from China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 703-730, June.
- Wruck, Karen Hopper & Jensen, Michael C., 1994. "Science, specific knowledge, and total quality management," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 247-287, November.
- James A. Brickley & Clifford W. Smith & Jerold L. Zimmerman, 2003. "Corporate Governance, Ethics, And Organizational Architecture," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 15(3), pages 34-45.
- Demsetz, Harold, 1988. "The Theory of the Firm Revisited," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 141-161, Spring. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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