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Refinancing and decentralization: Evidence from China

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  • Park, Albert
  • Shen, Minggao

Abstract

Decentralization can complement market liberalization by strengthening incentives of agents to respond to market signals. However, in China banks centralized lending authority following financial reforms in the mid-1990s. We present a new theory of financial decentralization in which centralization provides a credible commitment not to refinance bad projects by reducing available information. Using data from Chinese rural financial institutions, we empirically assess the determinants of decentralization and the likelihood of collateral seizure, strongly confirming the predictions of the refinancing model. We conclude that weak institutional environments may limit the efficiency of financial intermediation despite financial market liberalization.

Suggested Citation

  • Park, Albert & Shen, Minggao, 2008. "Refinancing and decentralization: Evidence from China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 703-730, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:66:y:2008:i:3-4:p:703-730
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    Cited by:

    1. Silvia Dominguez Martinez & Randolph Sloof & Ferdinand von Siemens, 2010. "Monitoring your Friends, not your Foes: Strategic Ignorance and the Delegation of Real Authority," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-101/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Qian, Meijun & Huang, Yasheng, 2016. "Political institutions, entrenchments, and the sustainability of economic development – A lesson from rural finance," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 152-178.
    3. Ghazi Zouari, 2011. "Specific knowledge, investment decision and organizational architecture," Working Papers CREGO 1110501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.

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