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State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature

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  • Pranab Bardhan

Abstract

This essay tries to bring out some of the complexities that are overlooked in the usual treatment of the state in the institutional economics literature and supplement the latter with a discussion of some alternative approaches to looking at the possible developmental role of the state. It refers to a broader range of development goals (including the structural transformation of the economy) and focuses on problems like the resolution of coordination failures and collective-action problems, the conflicting issues of commitment and accountability and the need for balancing the trade-offs they generate, some ingredients of state capacity and political coalition building usually missed in the literature, the possible importance of rent sharing in a political equilibrium, the advantages and problems of political centralization and decentralization, and the multidimensionality of state functions that may not be addressed by markets or private firms.

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  • Pranab Bardhan, 2016. "State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(3), pages 862-892, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:54:y:2016:i:3:p:862-92
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.20151239
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    Cited by:

    1. Ines A. Ferreira, 2018. "An empirical analysis of state fragility and growth: The impact of state ineffectiveness and political violence," WIDER Working Paper Series 029, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    2. Gwendoline Promsopha & Antoine Vion, 2017. "Thailand's 'limited order trap' : a critical application of North, Wallis and Weingast," Post-Print hal-01612052, HAL.
    3. repec:eee:wdevel:v:105:y:2018:i:c:p:70-82 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Prasenjit Banerjee & Vegard Iversen & Sandip Mitra & Antonio Nicolò & Kunal Sen, 2018. "Politicians and their promises in an uncertain world: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in India," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1806, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    5. repec:eee:jcecon:v:45:y:2017:i:4:p:685-711 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Kyle, Jordan, 2017. "Perspectives on the role of the state in economic development: Taking stock of the “Developmental State†after 35 years," IFPRI discussion papers 1597, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    7. repec:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:8:p:2455-78 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:bla:ausecr:v:50:y:2017:i:4:p:450-459 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy

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