IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejapp/v5y2013i4p241-55.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Fujiwara
  • Leonard Wantchekon

Abstract

This paper studies the electoral effects of town hall meetings based on programmatic, nonclientelist platforms. The experiment involves the cooperation of leading candidates in a presidential election in Benin. A campaign strategy based solely on these meetings was assigned to randomly selected villages and compared to the standard strategy of clientelist rallies. We find that treatment reduces the prevalence of clientelism and does not affect turnout. Treatment also lowers the vote shares for the candidate with a political stronghold in the village and is more effective in garnering votes in regions where a candidate does not have a political stronghold.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Fujiwara & Leonard Wantchekon, 2013. "Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 241-255, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:5:y:2013:i:4:p:241-55
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.5.4.241
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.5.4.241
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2011-0167_data.zip
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/app/2011-0167_app.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/ds/0504/2011-0167_ds.zip
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cesi Cruz & Philip Keefer & Julien Labonne, 2016. "Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 7730, Inter-American Development Bank.
    2. Peters, Jörg & Langbein, Jörg & Roberts, Gareth, 2017. "Generalization in the Tropics: Development policy, randomized controlled trials, and external validity," Ruhr Economic Papers 716, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    3. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, 2014. "Under the Thumb of History? Political Institutions and the Scope for Action," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 951-971, August.
    4. Cesi Cruz & Philip Keefer & Julien Labonne, 2016. "Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 94877, Inter-American Development Bank.
    5. Muhammad Haseeb & Kate Vyborny, 2016. "Imposing institutions: Evidence from cash transfer reform in Pakistan," CSAE Working Paper Series 2016-36, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    6. repec:eee:wdevel:v:95:y:2017:i:c:p:254-267 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Dewan, Torun & Meriläinen, Jaakko & Tukiainen, Janne, 2018. "Victorian Voting: Party Orientation and Class Alignment Revisited," Working Papers 103, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    8. repec:tsj:stataj:y:17:y:2017:i:3:p:630-651 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Marta Curto‐Grau & Albert Solé‐Ollé & Pilar Sorribas‐Navarro, 2017. "Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?," Working Papers 2017/04, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    10. Pranab Bardhan, 2016. "State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(3), pages 862-892, September.
    11. Miquel Pellicer & Eva Wegner & Lindsay Benstead & Harold Kincaid & Ellen Lust & Juanita Vasquez, 2014. "The demand side of clientelism: The role of client's perceptions and values," SALDRU Working Papers 140, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
    12. Catalina Tejada & Eliana Ferrara & Henrik Kleven & Florian Blum & Oriana Bandiera & Michel Azulai, 2015. "State Effectiveness, Growth, and Development," Working Papers id:6668, eSocialSciences.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

    Lists

    This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
    1. Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin (AEJ:AE 2013) in ReplicationWiki

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:5:y:2013:i:4:p:241-55. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael P. Albert). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.