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Does Elite Capture Matter? Local Elites and Targeted Welfare Programs in Indonesia

Author

Listed:
  • Vivi Alatas
  • Abhijit Banerjee
  • Rema Hanna
  • Benjamin A. Olken
  • Ririn Purnamasari
  • Matthew Wai-Poi

Abstract

This paper investigates how elite capture affects the welfare gains from targeted government transfer programs in Indonesia, using both a high-stakes field experiment that varied the extent of elite influence and nonexperimental data on a variety of existing government programs. While the relatives of those holding formal leadership positions are more likely to receive benefits in some programs, we argue that the welfare consequences of elite capture appear small: eliminating elite capture entirely would improve the welfare gains from these programs by less than one percent.

Suggested Citation

  • Vivi Alatas & Abhijit Banerjee & Rema Hanna & Benjamin A. Olken & Ririn Purnamasari & Matthew Wai-Poi, 2019. "Does Elite Capture Matter? Local Elites and Targeted Welfare Programs in Indonesia," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 109, pages 334-339, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:apandp:v:109:y:2019:p:334-39
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20191047
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Abhijit Banerjee, 2016. "Policies for a better-fed world," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 152(1), pages 3-17, February.
    2. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, 2014. "Under the Thumb of History? Political Institutions and the Scope for Action," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 951-971, August.
    3. Antonio Estache, 2016. "Institutions for Infrastructure in Developing Countries: What We Know and the Lot We still Need to Know," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2016-27, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. Duflo, Esther & Dupas, Pascaline & Kremer, Michael, 2015. "School governance, teacher incentives, and pupil–teacher ratios: Experimental evidence from Kenyan primary schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 92-110.
    5. Nasrudin, Rus'an, 2015. "Does Soft Corruption Make Grease or Sand for Development? Evidence from Road's Special Allocation Fund for Indonesian Districts," MPRA Paper 80578, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Aug 2017.
    6. Adama Bah & Samuel Bazzi & Sudarno Sumarto & Julia Tobias, 2019. "Finding the Poor vs. Measuring Their Poverty: Exploring the Drivers of Targeting Effectiveness in Indonesia," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 33(3), pages 573-597.
    7. Dizon-Ross, Rebecca & Dupas, Pascaline & Robinson, Jonathan, 2017. "Governance and the effectiveness of public health subsidies: Evidence from Ghana, Kenya and Uganda," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 150-169.
    8. Tohari, Achmad & Parsons, Christopher & Rammohan, Anu, 2017. "Does Information Empower the Poor? Evidence from Indonesia's Social Security Card," IZA Discussion Papers 11137, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Muhammad Haseeb & Kate Vyborny, 2016. "Imposing institutions: Evidence from cash transfer reform in Pakistan," CSAE Working Paper Series 2016-36, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    10. Raj M. Desai & Shareen Joshi, 2014. "Collective Action and Community Development: Evidence from Self-Help Groups in Rural India," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 28(3), pages 492-524.
    11. Deden Dinar Iskandar & Firmansyah Firmansyah, 2019. "How Groups Diversity and Power Intensity of Leaders may Affect Corruption of Public Resource in Communities: Insights from Laboratory Experiment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(4), pages 2566-2571.
    12. Schleicher, Michael & Souares, Aurélia & Pacere, Athanase Narangoro & Sauerborn, Rainer & Klonner, Stefan, 2016. "Decentralized versus Statistical Targeting of Anti-Poverty Programs: Evidence from Burkina Faso," Working Papers 0623, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    13. Pranab Bardhan, 2016. "State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(3), pages 862-892, September.
    14. Fafchamps, Marcel, 2016. "Family Networks and Distributive Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 11245, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. L. Kempen, 2014. "Mansuri, Ghazala and Rao, Vijayendra: Localizing development. Does participation work?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 112(2), pages 201-205, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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