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Contract and Economic Organization


  • Oliver E. Williamson


[fre] L'économie des coûts de transaction traite l'analyse de l'organisation économique principalement comme un problème de gouvernance des relations contractuelles. Cette approche a combiné les apports des recherches juridiques, économiques et en organisation, pour identifier les modes alternatifs de gouvernance, pour en définir les attributs pertinents et pour en expliquer les performances relatives. Depuis sa création, l'économie des coûts de transaction a évolué, partant de méthodes d'analyse non-formalisées et aboutissant à des méthodes formalisées, bien que la formalisation de la rationalité limitée demeure insatisfaisante. [eng] Transaction cost economics analyzes the organization of economic activities as problem of governance of contractual relations. This approach combines research results in law, economics and organizational sciences to identify alternative governance modes, to point out their relevant attributes, and to explain their relative performances. Transaction Cost Economics evolved over time. Starting with non formalized method, it is today a more formal theory, even if the formalization of bounded rationality is still not fully satisfying.

Suggested Citation

  • Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "Contract and Economic Organization," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 55-66.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recind:rei_0154-3229_2000_num_92_1_1036
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rei.2000.1036

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Massimo Egidi, 1995. "Routines, Hierarchies of Problems, Procedural Behaviour: Some Evidence fom Experiments," CEEL Working Papers 9503, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    2. Egidi, Massimo & Narduzzo, Alessandro, 1997. "The emergence of path-dependent behaviors in cooperative contexts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 677-709, October.
    3. George Loewenstein & Richard H Thaler, 2003. "Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000784, David K. Levine.
    4. Cohen, Michael D, et al, 1996. "Routines and Other Recurring Action Patterns of Organizations: Contemporary Research Issues," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(3), pages 653-698.
    5. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-291, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Glanchant, J-M. & Pignon, V., 2003. "Nordic Electricity Congestion's Arrangement as a Model for Europe: Physical Constraints or Operators' Opportunity," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0313, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Céline Chatelin & Stéphane Trebucq, 2002. "Du processus d'élaboration du cadre conceptuel en gouvernance d'entreprise A development process Of a conceptual framework of corporate governance," Working Papers CREGO 1021201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    3. Darine Bakkour, 2013. "L’approche contractuelle du concept de gouvernance," Studies and Syntheses 13-04, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2013.

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