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Contract and Economic Organization

Listed author(s):
  • Oliver E. Williamson

[fre] L'économie des coûts de transaction traite l'analyse de l'organisation économique principalement comme un problème de gouvernance des relations contractuelles. Cette approche a combiné les apports des recherches juridiques, économiques et en organisation, pour identifier les modes alternatifs de gouvernance, pour en définir les attributs pertinents et pour en expliquer les performances relatives. Depuis sa création, l'économie des coûts de transaction a évolué, partant de méthodes d'analyse non-formalisées et aboutissant à des méthodes formalisées, bien que la formalisation de la rationalité limitée demeure insatisfaisante. [eng] Transaction cost economics analyzes the organization of economic activities as problem of governance of contractual relations. This approach combines research results in law, economics and organizational sciences to identify alternative governance modes, to point out their relevant attributes, and to explain their relative performances. Transaction Cost Economics evolved over time. Starting with non formalized method, it is today a more formal theory, even if the formalization of bounded rationality is still not fully satisfying.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue d'économie industrielle.

Volume (Year): 92 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 55-66

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Handle: RePEc:prs:recind:rei_0154-3229_2000_num_92_1_1036
Note: DOI:10.3406/rei.2000.1036
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