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Analyse exploratoire de quelques stratégies de fourniture ‘non publique’ des biens ‘publics’

Author

Listed:
  • Christophe Déprés

    () (UMR INRA-ENESAD CESAER et Cemagref, 24, avenue des Landais, BP 5085, 63172 Aubière Cedex)

  • Gilles Grolleau

    (UMR INRA-ENESAD (CESAER), 26, rue du Dr. Petitjean, BP 87999, 21079 Dijon)

  • Naoufel Mzoughi

    (UMR INRA-ENESAD (CESAER), 26, rue du Dr. Petitjean, BP 87999, 21079 Dijon Cedex)

Abstract

Le caractère ‘collectif’ de certains biens et services a souvent légitimé, parfois indûment, l’intervention de la ‘main visible’ de l’Etat. L’économie néo-institutionnelle initiée par Coase conteste cette vision en interrogeant la nature même des biens et en resituant le débat sur le terrain de l’efficience économique. Prenant acte, nous définissons le concept de bien en référence à son mode de financement, de production et d’accès, ce qui fait apparaître son caractère construit. L’approche coasienne cherche, dans une perspective comparative, à identifier les arrangements institutionnels réels susceptibles de minimiser l’ensemble des coûts de production et de transaction. Une telle approche n’aboutit pas nécessairement à la négation de l’intervention étatique, mais plutôt à une redéfinition des modalités de son intervention afin de permettre la réalisation des bénéfices propres aux arrangements privés. La mobilisation de la grille d’analyse de l’économie des coûts de transaction nous permet de mettre en évidence la diversité des arrangements possibles sur un continuum allant du ‘tout-Etat’ au ‘tout-marché’. Nous étudions trois arrangements institutionnels susceptibles d’aboutir à la production non publique stricto sensu de biens publics d’environnement : l’association de bénéfices privés, l’organisation collective, la contractualisation. Les modalités d’implication des pouvoirs publics sont mentionnées, en insistant sur le degré de mixité des arrangements institutionnels. Les exemples évoqués concernent essentiellement le secteur agricole, où la nature collective de certaines productions environnementales a considérablement servi à justifier l’intervention de l’Etat.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Déprés & Gilles Grolleau & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2005. "Analyse exploratoire de quelques stratégies de fourniture ‘non publique’ des biens ‘publics’," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 74, pages 27-45.
  • Handle: RePEc:rae:jouces:v:74:y:2005:p:27-45
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    References listed on IDEAS

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