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Contracting for Environmental Property Rights: The Case of Vittel

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  • CHRISTOPHE DEPRES
  • GILLES GROLLEAU
  • NAOUFEL MZOUGHI

Abstract

Based on a real case of contracting for environmental property rights, we explore several implications of Coase's insights. The case study adds empirical content to basic transaction costs concepts by analysing the design and implementation of a contractual arrangement between a pollutee-a bottler of mineral water-and several polluting farmers. We analyse the bargaining between the two parties to determine how transaction cost issues (valuation disputes, bilateral monopoly conditions and third-party effects) were overcome and how they succeeded in contracting for environmental property rights. We compare the Vittel case with other similar cases to draw lessons for environmental rights negotiations. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2007.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Depres & Gilles Grolleau & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2008. "Contracting for Environmental Property Rights: The Case of Vittel," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(299), pages 412-434, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:75:y:2008:i:299:p:412-434
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    Cited by:

    1. Joël Houdet & Michel Trommetter & Jacques Weber, 2009. "Changing business perceptions regarding biodiversity: from impact mitigation towards new strategies and practices," Working Papers hal-00412875, HAL.
    2. Joël Houdet & Charlotte Pavageau & Michel Trommetter & Jacques Weber, 2009. "Accounting for changes in biodiversity and ecosystem services from a business perspective," Working Papers hal-00434450, HAL.
    3. repec:eee:ejores:v:267:y:2018:i:1:p:368-380 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Douadia Bougherara & Gilles Grolleau & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2009. "The ‘make or buy’ decision in private environmental transactions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 79-99, February.
    5. Noriaki Matsushima & Ryusuke Shinohara, 2015. "Pre-negotiation commitment and internalization in public good provision through bilateral negotiations," ISER Discussion Paper 0948r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Aug 2017.
    6. Ornella Boutry, 2010. "A New Institutional Approach of Resource Use Conflicts: The Case of Poitou-Charentes," Post-Print hal-00655829, HAL.
    7. Edward L. Glaeser & David I. Laibson & José A. Scheinkman & Christine L. Soutter, 2000. "Measuring Trust," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(3), pages 811-846.
      • Glaeser, Edward Ludwig & Laibson, David I. & Scheinkman, Jose A. & Soutter, Christine L., 2000. "Measuring Trust," Scholarly Articles 4481497, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    8. Schleyer, Christian & Theesfeld, Insa & Hagedorn, Konrad & Aznar, Olivier & Callois, Jean-Marc & Verburg, Rene & Yelkouni, Martin & Olsson, Johanna Alkan, 2007. "Approach towards an operational tool to apply institutional analysis for the assessment of policy feasibility within SEAMLESS-IF," Reports 9295, SEAMLESS: System for Environmental and Agricultural Modelling, Linking European Science and Society.
    9. Zhang, Daowei, 2016. "Payments for forest-based environmental services: A close look," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 78-84.
    10. Houdet, Joël & Trommetter, Michel & Weber, Jacques, 2012. "Understanding changes in business strategies regarding biodiversity and ecosystem services," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 37-46.
    11. François Facchini, 2008. "Droit de propriété et gestion des conflits agriculture - environnement," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00732380, HAL.
    12. Grolleau, Gilles & McCann, Laura M.J., 2012. "Designing watershed programs to pay farmers for water quality services: Case studies of Munich and New York City," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 87-94.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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