Access regulation in the next generation access network environment: A comparative study of Hong Kong and Singapore from the transaction cost economics perspectives
Hong Kong and Singapore have adopted two different models in the regulation of the next generation access (NGA) networks. In Hong Kong, the government has decided that access regulation will not be applied to fibre-based access networks and its strategy will be to rely on facilities-based competition to promote investment in the NGA networks. Singapore, on the other hand, has promoted access/services-based competition over a next generation broadband infrastructure subsidised by public funding and operated on an open accessbasis. This paper applies the theories of transaction cost economics (TCE) to analyse the two different regulatory models adopted in Hong Kong and Singapore for the NGA networks. Transaction cost economics is concerned with the study of governance structures. Governance structures operate within the relationship between transacting parties for the purpose of dealing with contractual hazards. Market, firms, regulation, public franchise and public ownership are alternative governance structures operating in the NGA environment. Governance structures aim to minimise transaction costs caused by contractual hazards.
|Date of creation:||2012|
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