IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression

  • Williamson, Oliver E.

    (University of California, Berkeley)

Oliver E. Williamson delivered his Prize Lecture on 8 December 2009 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. He was introduced by Professor Bertil Holmlund, Chairman of the Economic Sciences Prize Committee.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/williamson-lecture.html
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Nobel Prize Committee in its series Nobel Prize in Economics documents with number 2009-3.

as
in new window

Length: 1 pages
Date of creation: 08 Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2009_003
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.nobelprize.org

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Fischer, Stanley, 1977. "`Long-term contracting, sticky prices, and monetary policy' : A comment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 317-323, July.
  2. Oliver E. Williamson, 2002. "The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 171-195, Summer.
  3. DREZE , Jacques H., 1994. "Forty Years of Public Economics : A Personal Perspective," CORE Discussion Papers 1994075, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001. "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
  5. Oliver E. Williamson, 2008. "Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(2), pages 247-272, October.
  6. Coase, R H, 1988. "The Nature of the Firm: Influence," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 33-47, Spring.
  7. Coase, R H, 1988. "The Nature of the Firm: Origin," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 3-17, Spring.
  8. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-40, September.
  9. Stigler, George J, 1992. "Law or Economics?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 455-68, October.
  10. Buchanan, James M, 1975. "A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(2), pages 225-30, May.
  11. Oliver E. Williamson, 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 73-104, Spring.
  12. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
  13. repec:reg:rpubli:219 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Simon, Herbert A., 1984. "On the behavioral and rational foundations of economic dynamics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 35-55, March.
  15. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-90, June.
  16. Brian Snowdon & Howard R. Vane, 1997. "Modern macroeconomics and its evolution from a monetarist perspective: An interview with Professor Milton Friedman," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 24(4), pages 191-221, September.
  17. Oliver E. Williamson, 2003. "Examining economic organization through the lens of contract," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 917-942, August.
  18. George J. Stigler, 1951. "The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59, pages 185.
  19. Shultz, George P, 1995. "Economics in Action: Ideas, Institutions, Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 1-8, May.
  20. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-46, October.
  21. Lewis, Tracy R, 1983. "Preemption, Divestiture, and Forward Contracting in a Market Dominated by a Single Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 1092-1101, December.
  22. Per-Olof Bjuggren & Dennis C. Mueller (ed.), 2009. "The Modern Firm, Corporate Governance and Investment," Books, Edward Elgar, number 13362, 6.
  23. Coase, R H, 1988. "The Nature of the Firm: Meaning," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 19-32, Spring.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2009_003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.