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Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression

Author

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  • Williamson, Oliver E.

    (University of California, Berkeley)

Abstract

Oliver E. Williamson delivered his Prize Lecture on 8 December 2009 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. He was introduced by Professor Bertil Holmlund, Chairman of the Economic Sciences Prize Committee.

Suggested Citation

  • Williamson, Oliver E., 2009. "Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2009-3, Nobel Prize Committee.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2009_003
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001. "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
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    4. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    5. Williamson, Oliver, 2009. "The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 111-134, December.
    6. Jacques H. Dreze, 1995. "Forty Years of Public Economics: A Personal Perspective," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 111-130, Spring.
    7. Oliver E. Williamson, 2003. "Examining economic organization through the lens of contract," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 12(4), pages 917-942, August.
    8. Macher Jeffrey T & Richman Barak D, 2008. "Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-65, May.
    9. Steven Tadelis, 2002. "Complexity, Flexibility, and the Make-or-Buy Decision," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 433-437, May.
    10. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    11. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    12. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-246, October.
    13. Stigler, George J, 1992. "Law or Economics?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 455-468, October.
    14. Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, 2010. "Contracting For Government Services: Theory And Evidence From U.S. Cities," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(3), pages 507-541, September.
    15. R. H. Coase, 1972. "Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect, Volume 3, Policy Issues and Research Opportunities in Industrial Organization, pages 59-73, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    17. Fischer, Stanley, 1977. "`Long-term contracting, sticky prices, and monetary policy' : A comment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 317-323, July.
    18. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
    19. Coase, R H, 1988. "The Nature of the Firm: Influence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 33-47, Spring.
    20. Oliver E. Williamson, 2009. "Opening the Black Box of Firm and Market Organization: Antitrust," Chapters, in: Per-Olof Bjuggren & Dennis C. Mueller (ed.), The Modern Firm, Corporate Governance and Investment, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    21. Brian Snowdon & Howard R. Vane, 1997. "Modern macroeconomics and its evolution from a monetarist perspective: An interview with Professor Milton Friedman," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 24(4), pages 191-221, September.
    22. Coase, R H, 1988. "The Nature of the Firm: Meaning," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 19-32, Spring.
    23. Coase, R H, 1988. "The Nature of the Firm: Origin," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 3-17, Spring.
    24. Oliver E. Williamson, 2008. "Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(2), pages 247-272, October.
    25. Oliver E. Williamson, 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 73-104, Spring.
    26. Lewis, Tracy R, 1983. "Preemption, Divestiture, and Forward Contracting in a Market Dominated by a Single Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 1092-1101, December.
    27. Macher, Jeffrey T. & Richman, Barak D., 2008. "Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 1-63, April.
    28. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    29. Shultz, George P, 1995. "Economics in Action: Ideas, Institutions, Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 1-8, May.
    30. Simon, Herbert A., 1985. "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 293-304, June.
    31. repec:reg:rpubli:219 is not listed on IDEAS
    32. Riordan, Michael H. & Williamson, Oliver E., 1985. "Asset specificity and economic organization," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 365-378, December.
    33. Per-Olof Bjuggren & Dennis C. Mueller (ed.), 2009. "The Modern Firm, Corporate Governance and Investment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13362.
    34. William Fellner, 1947. "Prices and Wages under Bilateral Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 61(4), pages 503-532.
    35. William M. Dugger, 1996. "The Mechanisms of Governance," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 1212-1216, December.
    36. Williamson, Oliver E, 1971. "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 112-123, May.
    37. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
    38. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-390, June.
    39. Simon, Herbert A., 1984. "On the behavioral and rational foundations of economic dynamics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 35-55, March.
    40. George J. Stigler, 1951. "The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59, pages 185-185.
    41. Buchanan, James M, 1975. "A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(2), pages 225-230, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Transaction; costs;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General

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    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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