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Contractual Choice and Performance the Case of Water Supply in France

Listed author(s):
  • Claude Ménard
  • Stéphane Saussier

[fre] Il existe une littérature abondante en économie des coûts de transaction sur le choix d'une entreprise entre faire ou faire faire. À notre connaissance, il n'y a pas de test économétrique de ce type portant sur l'arbitrage que fait un gouvernement entre offrir directement un service ou le confier à un opérateur. Nous présentons un tel test, utilisant une base de données qui porte sur l'ensemble des Unités Distributrices d'Eau pour les villes françaises de plus de 5000 habitants. Nos résultats suggèrent fortement : 1) qu'il y a une logique économique dans les choix contractuels effectués ; 2) qu'il n'y pas d'avantage absolu pour un mode de gouvernance, les performances dépendant de l'adéquation d'un mode aux attributs des transactions. [eng] There is a vast literature in transaction cost economics on the choice made by firms to integrate or not. To our knowledge, there have been no previous tests for understanding decisions made by governments to provide a service or to outsource. Our paper presents such a test, using a data base on all units supplying water for towns of more than 5000 inhabitants in France. Our results strongly support that : 1) There is an economic rationale to contractual choices in public utilities ; 2) There is no absolute advantage for one specific mode of governance, performance depending on the fitness of the mode of governance to the attributes of the transaction.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue d'économie industrielle.

Volume (Year): 92 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 385-404

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Handle: RePEc:prs:recind:rei_0154-3229_2000_num_92_1_1058
Note: DOI:10.3406/rei.2000.1058
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