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How to Organise Nature Production by Farmers

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  • Slangen, Louis H G

Abstract

When farmers contract to produce 'nature,' they act as agents to the government's principal. Principal-agent theory provides a comprehensive analytical framework for studying this relationship. The principal and agent must cope with uncertainty and asymmetrical and imperfect information, and therefore transactions may take place under adverse selection and moral hazard. The farmers' uncertainty relates to the contract and the government's inconsistency over time. Also important is their attitude to risk. A participation bonus equilibrium. Farmers can anticipate the uncertainties of government time inconsistencies by adopting a more risk-averse position. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Slangen, Louis H G, 1997. "How to Organise Nature Production by Farmers," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 24(3-4), pages 508-529.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:erevae:v:24:y:1997:i:3-4:p:508-29
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eggers, Jorg & Mettepenningen, Evy & Beckmann, Volker, 2007. "Assessing The Efficiency Of Local Action Groups And Auctions For Designing And Implementing Agri-Environmental Measures In The Eu - Results From An Expert Survey," 47th Annual Conference, Weihenstephan, Germany, September 26-28, 2007 7584, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
    2. Polman, Nico B.P. & Peerlings, Jack H.M., 2002. "The Role of Transaction Costs and Bargaining Power in Wildlife and Landscape Services Production: A Micro-Econometric Model for Dutch Dairy Farms," 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain 24948, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    3. Yayan Xie & Yang Su & Feng Li, 2022. "The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Low Carbon Production Behaviour of Farmers, Government and Consumers in Food Safety Source Governance," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(19), pages 1-16, September.
    4. Signe Anthon & Serge Garcia & Anne Stenger, 2006. "Incentive Contracts for Natura 2000 Implementation: A Mixed Model of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2006-06, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA.
    5. Gurr, Geoff M. & Wratten, Steve D. & Altieri, Miguel A., 2004. "Ecological engineering: a new direction for agricultural pest management," AFBM Journal, Australasian Farm Business Management Network, vol. 1, pages 1-7.
    6. Eggers, J. & Mettepenningen, E. & Beckmann, V., 2008. "Assessing the Efficienc of Local Action Groups and Auctions for Designing and Implenting Agri-Environmental Measures in the EU – Results from an Expert Survey," Proceedings “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e.V.”, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), vol. 43, March.
    7. Jongeneel, Roelof A. & Polman, Nico B.P. & Slangen, Louis H.G., 2005. "Why Are Farmers Going Multifunctional?," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24585, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    8. Déprés, Christophe & Grolleau, Gilles & Mzoughi, Naoufel, 2005. "Analyse exploratoire de quelques stratégies de fourniture ‘non publique’ des biens ‘publics’," Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 74.
    9. Alban Richard & Michel Trommetter, 2000. "Choix de mécanismes incitatifs dans les contrats agri-environnementaux," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 145(4), pages 145-155.

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