Risk aversion as effort incentive: A correction and prima facie test of the moral hazard theory of share tenancy
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
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Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA), vol. 1(1), pages 1-20, June.
- James Roumasset, 2004. "Rural Institutions, Agricultural Development, and Pro-Poor Economic Growth," Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA), vol. 1(1), pages 61-82, June.
- James Andreoni & Deniz Aydin & Blake Barton & B. Douglas Bernheim & Jeffrey Naecker, 2020.
"When Fair Isn’t Fair: Understanding Choice Reversals Involving Social Preferences,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(5), pages 1673-1711.
- James Andreoni & Deniz Aydin & Blake Barton & B. Douglas Bernheim & Jeffrey Naecker, 2018. "When Fair Isn't Fair: Understanding Choice Reversals Involving Social Preferences," NBER Working Papers 25257, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James Andreoni & B. Douglas Bernheim, 2009.
"Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(5), pages 1607-1636, September.
- James Andreoni & B. Douglas Bernheim, 2007. "Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects," Discussion Papers 07-030, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Roumasset, James A., 2006. "The Economics of Agricultural Development: What Have We Learned?," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25598, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
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Keywords
agricultural contracts;JEL classification:
- O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
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