A theory of sharecropping: the role of price behavior and imperfect competition
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- Sen, Debapriya, 2011. "A theory of sharecropping: The role of price behavior and imperfect competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 181-199.
- Sen, Debapriya, 2009. "A theory of sharecropping: the role of price behavior and imperfect competition," MPRA Paper 19021, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Cited by:
- Raul V. Fabella, 2016. "Why Fixed Rent Contracts are Less Prevalent: Weak Third Party Enforcement and Endogenous Principal Type," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201606, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
More about this item
Keywords
Sharecropping; price variation; imperfect competition; tenancy contracts; crop-buying contracts; interlinkage; the epsilon-agent;JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- J43 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Agricultural Labor Markets
- O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
- O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2009-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-05-02 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2009-05-02 (Microeconomics)
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