Interlinkage, limited liability and strategic interaction
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- Basu, Kaushik & Bell, Clive & Bose, Pinaki, 1999. "Interlinkage, limited liability, and strategic interaction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2134, The World Bank.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Sen, Debapriya, 2011.
"A theory of sharecropping: The role of price behavior and imperfect competition,"
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Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 181-199.
- Sen, Debapriya, 2009. "A theory of sharecropping: the role of price behavior and imperfect competition," MPRA Paper 14898, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sen, Debapriya, 2009. "A theory of sharecropping: the role of price behavior and imperfect competition," MPRA Paper 19021, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Debapriya Sen, 2005. "Sharecropping, interlinkage, and price variation," Department of Economics Working Papers 05-10, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
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- Mansuri, Ghazala, 2007. "Credit layering in informal financial markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 715-730, November.
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More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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