The Distortionary Effects of Incentives in Government: Evidence from China's "Death Ceiling" Program
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- Raymond Fisman & Yongxiang Wang, 2017. "The Distortionary Effects of Incentives in Government: Evidence from China's “Death Ceiling” Program," NBER Working Papers 23098, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Shi, Xiangyu & Xi, Tianyang, 2018. "Race to safety: Political competition, neighborhood effects, and coal mine deaths in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 79-95.
- Sergei Guriev, 2019.
"Gorbachev versus Deng: A Review of Chris Miller's The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy,"
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- Aney, Madhav S. & Ho, Christine, 2019. "Deadlier road accidents? Traffic safety regulations and heterogeneous motorists’ behavior," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 155-171.
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More about this item
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
- J81 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Working Conditions
- O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
- P36 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Consumer Economics; Health; Education and Training; Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty
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