IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v212y2023icp1143-1172.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Under pressure? Performance evaluation of police officers as an incentive to cheat

Author

Listed:
  • Travova, Ekaterina

Abstract

This paper examines the use of high-powered performance-based incentives for civil servants, focusing on drug-related cases registered by the Russian police. Using an event study approach and bunching analysis, I show that the incentives arising from the performance evaluation system of police officers can significantly influence their behavior. Specifically, I find evidence suggesting that this impact can result in the manipulation of drug quantities seized by the police, moving offenders from below to above the punishment threshold. Further negative consequences of the strong performance-based incentives are inequality in the enforcement of law, prolonged sentences, and increased probability of pretrial detention. Thus, I determine that police officers are more likely to manipulate the drug quantities seized from men. I also find that the manipulation increases the probability of pretrial detention by 9% and adds one more year of incarceration, which is a 67% increase on the average sentence length without manipulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Travova, Ekaterina, 2023. "Under pressure? Performance evaluation of police officers as an incentive to cheat," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 1143-1172.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:212:y:2023:i:c:p:1143-1172
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.05.021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268123001749
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.05.021?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Imran Rasul & Daniel Rogger, 2018. "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(608), pages 413-446, February.
    2. Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann & Alex Tabarrok, 2019. "To Serve and Collect: The Fiscal and Racial Determinants of Law Enforcement," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(1), pages 189-216.
    3. Traxler, Christian & Westermaier, Franz G. & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2018. "Bunching on the Autobahn? Speeding responses to a ‘notched’ penalty scheme," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 78-94.
    4. Abhijit Banerjee & Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo & Daniel Keniston & Nina Singh, 2021. "Improving Police Performance in Rajasthan, India: Experimental Evidence on Incentives, Managerial Autonomy, and Training," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 36-66, February.
    5. David Bjerk, 2017. "Mandatory Minimums and the Sentencing of Federal Drug Crimes," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(1), pages 93-128.
    6. Diane Alexander, 2020. "How Do Doctors Respond to Incentives? Unintended Consequences of Paying Doctors to Reduce Costs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(11), pages 4046-4096.
    7. Imran Rasul & Daniel Rogger, 2018. "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(608), pages 413-446, February.
    8. Felipe Goncalves & Steven Mello, 2021. "A Few Bad Apples? Racial Bias in Policing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(5), pages 1406-1441, May.
    9. Raymond Fisman & Yongxiang Wang, 2017. "The Distortionary Effects of Incentives in Government: Evidence from China's "Death Ceiling" Program," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 202-218, April.
    10. Jacob, Brian A., 2005. "Accountability, incentives and behavior: the impact of high-stakes testing in the Chicago Public Schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 761-796, June.
    11. Emmanuel Saez, 2010. "Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 180-212, August.
    12. Lepage, Louis-Pierre, 2020. "Are criminals strategic? Offender responses to drug sentencing cutoffs," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    13. Alexandre Mas, 2006. "Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(3), pages 783-821.
    14. Anbarci, Nejat & Lee, Jungmin, 2014. "Detecting racial bias in speed discounting: Evidence from speeding tickets in Boston," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 11-24.
    15. Bjerk, David, 2005. "Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 591-625, October.
    16. Singh, Prakarsh & Masters, William A., 2017. "Impact of caregiver incentives on child health: Evidence from an experiment with Anganwadi workers in India," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 219-231.
    17. Daron Acemoglu & Leopoldo Fergusson & James Robinson & Dario Romero & Juan F. Vargas, 2020. "The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 1-43, August.
    18. Elliott Ash & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2015. "Intrinsic Motivation in Public Service: Theory and Evidence from State Supreme Courts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4).
    19. André Schultz & Vladimir Kozlov & Alexander Libman, 2014. "Judicial alignment and criminal justice: evidence from Russian courts," Post-Soviet Affairs, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(2-3), pages 137-170, May.
    20. Ella Paneyakh, 2014. "Faking performance together: systems of performance evaluation in Russian enforcement agencies and production of bias and privilege," Post-Soviet Affairs, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(2-3), pages 115-136, May.
    21. Raj Chetty & John N. Friedman & Tore Olsen & Luigi Pistaferri, 2011. "Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(2), pages 749-804.
    22. Rebecca Diamond & Petra Persson, 2016. "The Long-term Consequences of Teacher Discretion in Grading of High-stakes Tests," NBER Working Papers 22207, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Esther Duflo & Rema Hanna & Stephen P. Ryan, 2012. "Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1241-1278, June.
    24. Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, 2009. "Political Economy at Any Speed: What Determines Traffic Citations?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 509-527, March.
    25. Brian A. Jacob & Steven D. Levitt, 2003. "Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(3), pages 843-877.
    26. Anna Bindler & Randi Hjalmarsson, 2020. "The Persistence of the Criminal Justice Gender Gap: Evidence from 200 Years of Judicial Decisions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(2), pages 297-339.
    27. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    28. Dixit, Avinash, 1997. "Power of Incentives in Private versus Public Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 378-382, May.
    29. Vadim Volkov, 2016. "Legal and Extralegal Origins of Sentencing Disparities: Evidence from Russia's Criminal Courts," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(4), pages 637-665, December.
    30. Henrik J. Kleven & Mazhar Waseem, 2013. "Using Notches to Uncover Optimization Frictions and Structural Elasticities: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(2), pages 669-723.
    31. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo & Rachel Glennerster, 2008. "Putting a Band-Aid on a Corpse: Incentives for Nurses in the Indian Public Health Care System," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 487-500, 04-05.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rodrigo Carril, 2021. "Rules Versus Discretion in Public Procurement," Working Papers 1232, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Homonoff, Tatiana & Spreen, Thomas Luke & St. Clair, Travis, 2020. "Balance sheet insolvency and contribution revenue in public charities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    3. Dhammika Dharmapala, 2016. "Estimating the Compliance Costs of Securities Regulation: A Bunching Analysis of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404(b)," CESifo Working Paper Series 6180, CESifo.
    4. Traxler, Christian & Westermaier, Franz G. & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2018. "Bunching on the Autobahn? Speeding responses to a ‘notched’ penalty scheme," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 78-94.
    5. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772, Elsevier.
    6. Marx, Benjamin M., 2018. "Dynamic Bunching Estimation with Panel Data," MPRA Paper 88647, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Fan, Elliott & Lien, Hsienming & Ma, Ching-to Albert, 2019. "Uterus at a price: Disability insurance and hysterectomy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 1-17.
    8. Callen, Michael & Gulzar, Saad & Hasanain, Ali & Khan, Muhammad Yasir & Rezaee, Arman, 2020. "Data and policy decisions: Experimental evidence from Pakistan," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    9. De La O, Ana L. & González, Lucas I. & Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca, 2023. "Voluntary audits: Experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    10. Eric J. Allen & Patricia M. Dechow & Devin G. Pope & George Wu, 2017. "Reference-Dependent Preferences: Evidence from Marathon Runners," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(6), pages 1657-1672, June.
    11. Thomas S. Dee & Will Dobbie & Brian A. Jacob & Jonah Rockoff, 2019. "The Causes and Consequences of Test Score Manipulation: Evidence from the New York Regents Examinations," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 382-423, July.
    12. Felipe Goncalves & Steven Mello, 2021. "A Few Bad Apples? Racial Bias in Policing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(5), pages 1406-1441, May.
    13. Philippe Aghion & Ufuk Akcigit & Maxime Gravoueille & Matthieu Lequien & Stefanie Stantcheva, 2023. "Tax simplicity or simplicity of evasion? Evidence from self-employment taxes in France," POID Working Papers 050, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    14. Daron Acemoglu & Leopoldo Fergusson & James Robinson & Dario Romero & Juan F. Vargas, 2020. "The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 1-43, August.
    15. Laura Khoury, 2019. "Unemployment Benefits and the Timing of Redundancies: Evidence from Bunching," PSE Working Papers halshs-02057145, HAL.
    16. Chen, Shuo & Qiao, Xue & Zhu, Zhitao, 2021. "Chasing or cheating? Theory and evidence on China's GDP manipulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 657-671.
    17. Jan Palguta, 2013. "Nonlinear Incentive Schemes and Corruption in Public Procurement: Evidence from the Czech Republic," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp483, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    18. Laura Khoury, 2021. "Unemployment Benefits and the Timing of Redundancies," Working Papers halshs-02057145, HAL.
    19. Donna Harris & Oana Borcan & Danila Serra & Henry Telli & Bruno Schettini & Stefan Dercon, 2022. "Proud to belong: The impact of ethics training on police officers," CSAE Working Paper Series 2022-05, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    20. Cai, Xiqian & Jiang, Wei & Song, Hong & Xie, Huihua, 2022. "Pay for performance schemes and manufacturing worker productivity: Evidence from a kinked design in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Drug crimes; Police discretion; Performance evaluation; Incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:212:y:2023:i:c:p:1143-1172. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.