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The distortionary effects of incentives in government: Evidence from China'sdeath ceiling program

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Listed:
  • Raymond Fisman

    (Boston University)

  • Yongxiang Wang

    (University of Southern California)

Abstract

We study a 2004 program designed to motivate Chinese bureaucrats to reduce accidental deaths. Each province received a set of `death ceilings' that, if exceeded, would impede government officials' promotions. For each category of accidental deaths, we observe a sharp discontinuity in reported deaths at the ceiling, suggestive of manipulation. Provinces with safety incentives for municipal officials experienced larger declines in accidental deaths, suggesting complementarities between incentives at different levels of government. While realized accidental deaths predict the following year's ceiling, we observe no evidence that provinces manipulate deaths upward to avoid ratchet effects in the setting of death ceilings.

Suggested Citation

  • Raymond Fisman & Yongxiang Wang, "undated". "The distortionary effects of incentives in government: Evidence from China'sdeath ceiling program," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-282, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Jan 2017.
  • Handle: RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-282
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    File URL: http://sites.bu.edu/fisman/files/2016/06/Deathceilings-AEJ-revision-with-tables.pdf
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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Sam Watson’s journal round up for 10th April 2017
      by Sam Watson in The Academic Health Economists' Blog on 2017-04-10 15:00:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Sergei Guriev, 2019. "Gorbachev versus Deng: A Review of Chris Miller's The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 120-146, March.
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    3. Sergei Guriev, 2019. "Gorbachev versus Deng: A Review of Chris Miller's The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 120-146, March.
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    7. Raymond Fisman & Yongxiang Wang, 2017. "The Distortionary Effects of Incentives in Government: Evidence from China's "Death Ceiling" Program," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 202-218, April.
    8. Aney, Madhav S. & Ho, Christine, 2019. "Deadlier road accidents? Traffic safety regulations and heterogeneous motorists’ behavior," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 155-171.
    9. Fisman, Raymond & Lin, Hui & Sun, Cong & Wang, Yongxiang & Zhao, Daxuan, 2021. "What motivates non-democratic leadership: Evidence from COVID-19 reopenings in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    10. Chu, Yin & Holladay, J. Scott & Qiu, Yun & Tian, Xian-Liang & Zhou, Maigeng, 2023. "Air Pollution and Mortality Impacts of Coal Mining: Evidence from Coalmine Accidents in China," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1302, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    11. Kong, Dongmin & Ma, Guangyuan & Qin, Ni, 2022. "The political economy of firm emissions: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    12. Alan Benson & Danielle Li & Kelly Shue, 2018. "Promotions and the Peter Principle," NBER Working Papers 24343, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Alan Benson & Danielle Li & Kelly Shue, 2019. "Promotions and the Peter Principle," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 134(4), pages 2085-2134.
    14. Xu, Gang & Wang, Xue & Wang, Ruiting & Yano, Go & Zou, Rong, 2021. "Anti-corruption, safety compliance and coal mine deaths: Evidence from China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 458-488.
    15. Liangdong Lu & Hong Huang & Jiuchang Wei & Jia Xu, 2020. "Safety Regulations and the Uncertainty of Work‐Related Road Accident Loss: The Triple Identity of Chinese Local Governments Under Principal–Agent Framework," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(6), pages 1168-1182, June.
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    17. Sergei Guriev, 2019. "Gorbachev versus Deng: A Review of Chris Miller's 'The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy'," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03457000, HAL.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information disclosure; Political selection; Indian politics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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