Promotions and the Peter Principle
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- Jed DeVaro & Oliver Gürtler, 2020. "Strategic shirking in competitive labor markets: A general model of multi‐task promotion tournaments with employer learning," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 335-376, April.
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- Rocco Macchiavello & Andreas Menzel & Atonu Rabbani & Christopher Woodruff, 2020. "Challenges of Change: An Experiment Promoting Women to Managerial Roles in the Bangladeshi Garment Sector," NBER Working Papers 27606, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Fabo, Brian & Jančoková, Martina & Kempf, Elisabeth & Pástor, Luboš, 2021. "Fifty shades of QE: Conflicts of interest in economic research," IMFS Working Paper Series 147, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
- W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 2023.
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- MacLeod, W. Bentley & Malcomson, James, 2023. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On," IZA Discussion Papers 15881, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- W. Bentley MacLeod & James Malcomson, 2023. "Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment: thirty years on," Economics Series Working Papers 997, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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- Bhattacharya, D. & Shvets, J., 2022. "Inferring the Performance Diversity Trade-Off in University Admissions: Evidence from Cambridge," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2238, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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