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Social Ties and Favoritism in Chinese Science

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Listed:
  • Raymond Fisman
  • Jing Shi
  • Yongxiang Wang
  • Rong Xu

Abstract

We study favoritism via hometown ties, a common source of favor exchange in China, in fellow selection of the Chinese Academies of Sciences and Engineering. Hometown ties to fellow selection committee members increase candidates’ election probability by 39 percent, coming entirely from the selection stage involving an in-person meeting. Elected hometown-connected candidates are half as likely to have a high-impact publication as elected fellows without connections. CAS/CAE membership increases the probability of university leadership appointments and is associated with a US$9.5 million increase in annual funding for fellows’ institutions, indicating that hometown favoritism has potentially large effects on resource allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Raymond Fisman & Jing Shi & Yongxiang Wang & Rong Xu, 2018. "Social Ties and Favoritism in Chinese Science," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(3), pages 1134-1171.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/697086
    DOI: 10.1086/697086
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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