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Talent Hoarding in Organizations

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  • Ingrid Haegele

Abstract

Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, managers who are evaluated on team performance have an incentive to hoard workers. This study provides the first empirical evidence of talent hoarding using personnel records and survey evidence from a large manufacturing firm. Talent hoarding is reported by three-fourths of managers, is detectable in managerial decisions, and occurs more frequently when hoarding incentives are stronger. Using quasi-random variation in exposure to talent hoarding, I demonstrate that hoarding deters workers from applying to new positions, inhibiting worker career progression and altering the allocation of talent in the firm.

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  • Ingrid Haegele, 2022. "Talent Hoarding in Organizations," Papers 2206.15098, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2206.15098
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    Cited by:

    1. Caliendo, Marco & Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. & Pfeifer, Harald & Uhlendorff, Arne & Wehner, Caroline, 2024. "Managers’ risk preferences and firm training investments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    2. Jean-Michel Benkert & Igor Letina & Shuo Liu, 2023. "Startup Acquisitions: Acquihires and Talent Hoarding," Papers 2308.10046, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
    3. Jean-Michel Benkert, Igor Letina, Shuo Liu, 2023. "Startup Acquisitions: Acquihires and Talent Hoarding," Diskussionsschriften dp2309, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.

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