Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
- O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
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