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The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives

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  • Daron Acemoglu
  • Leopoldo Fergusson
  • James A. Robinson
  • Dario Romero
  • Juan F. Vargas

Abstract

High-powered incentives for the military and security services have become a common counterinsurgency strategy over the last several decades. We investigate the use of such incentives for members of the Colombian army in the long-running civil war against left-wing guerillas, and show that it produced several perverse side effects. Innocent civilians were killed and misrepresented as guerillas (a phenomenon known in Colombia as ‘false positives’). Exploiting the fact that Colombian colonels have stronger career concerns and should be more responsive to such incentives, we show that there were significantly more false positives during the period of high-powered incentives in municipalities where a higher share of brigades were commanded by colonels and in those where checks coming from civilian judicial institutions were weaker. We further find that in municipalities with a higher share of colonels, the period of high-powered incentives coincided with a worsening of local judicial institutions and no discernible improvement in the overall security situation.

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  • Daron Acemoglu & Leopoldo Fergusson & James A. Robinson & Dario Romero & Juan F. Vargas, 2016. "The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives," NBER Working Papers 22617, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22617
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    3. Hanming Fang & Chang Liu & Li-An Zhou, 2020. "Window Dressing in the Public Sector: A Case Study of China’s Compulsory Education Promotion Program," NBER Working Papers 27628, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    7. Samuel Bazzi & Robert A. Blair & Christopher Blattman & Oeindrila Dube & Matthew Gudgeon & Richard Peck, 2022. "The Promise and Pitfalls of Conflict Prediction: Evidence from Colombia and Indonesia," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 764-779, October.
    8. Mounu Prem & Andrés F. Rivera & Dario A. Romero & Juan F. Vargas, 2018. "Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace," Documentos de Trabajo 16385, Universidad del Rosario.
    9. Steven Riascos Carabalí & María del Pilar Castillo Valencia, 2020. "El ajuste de cuentas como un mecanismo para corregir contratos criminales," Revista Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Militar Nueva Granada, vol. 28(1), pages 67-88, June.
    10. Chen, Shuo & Qiao, Xue & Zhu, Zhitao, 2021. "Chasing or cheating? Theory and evidence on China's GDP manipulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 657-671.
    11. Gerardo Barbosa Castillo & Andrés Rolando Ciro Gómez, 2020. "Garantía de no repetición: una contribución a la justicia transicional," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 1183, October.
    12. Aparicio, Juan P. & Jetter, Michael, 2020. "Captivating News in Colombia," IZA Discussion Papers 13834, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Aparicio, Juan P. & Jetter, Michael, 2022. "Captivating news: Media attention and FARC kidnappings," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 69-81.
    14. Morales, Juan S., 2021. "Legislating during war: Conflict and politics in Colombia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    15. Gustav Agneman, 2022. "Conflict Victimization and Civilian Obedience: Evidence from Colombia," HiCN Working Papers 379, Households in Conflict Network.
    16. Travova, Ekaterina, 2023. "Under pressure? Performance evaluation of police officers as an incentive to cheat," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 1143-1172.
    17. Edgar H. Sanchez-Cuevas, 2018. "Fighting Fire with Aid: Development Assistance as Counterinsurency Tool. Evidence for Colombia," Documentos CEDE 16378, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    18. Mantilla, Cesar & Gelvez Ferreira, Juan David Gelvez & Nieto, Maria Paula, 2022. "Costly Norm Enforcement through Sanctions and Rewards: An Experiment with Colombian Future Police Officers," OSF Preprints aebxy, Center for Open Science.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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