IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

La política de seguridad democrática y las ejecuciones extrajudiciales


  • Ernesto Cárdenas


  • Edgar Villa


Este artículo formaliza a través de un mecanismo de principal-agente la política de seguridad democrática del Gobierno de Uribe, y muestra su relación con el incremento de las víctimas de ejecuciones extrajudiciales llamados “falsos positivos”. El modelo explica las fallas de la política de seguridad democrática al compararla con una política contrafáctica alterna que involucre un nivel óptimo de auditoría a las unidades militares para evitar falsos positivos. Se encuentra que esta política contrafáctica aumentaría el bienestar de la sociedad.

Suggested Citation

  • Ernesto Cárdenas & Edgar Villa, 2013. "La política de seguridad democrática y las ejecuciones extrajudiciales," Revista ESPE - Ensayos Sobre Política Económica, Banco de la República - ESPE, vol. 31(71), pages 64-72, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000107:010890

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Daron Acemoglu & Leopoldo Fergusson & James A. Robinson & Dario Romero & Juan F. Vargas, 2016. "The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives," NBER Working Papers 22617, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item


    Falsos positivos; Modelo principal-agente; Diseño de mecanismos; Política de seguridad democrática;

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000107:010890. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Espe). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.