IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/016385.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace

Author

Listed:
  • Mounu Prem

    ()

  • Andrés F. Rivera
  • Dario A. Romero
  • Juan F. Vargas

    ()

Abstract

We study the unintended consequences of the recent peace process in Colombia, that ended over five decades of internal armed conflict with the FARC insurgency. Using a triple differences empirical strategy, we show that the permanent ceasefire that started in December 2014 in the context of the peace negotiations was followed by an increase in the killing of social leaders in previously FARC-dominated territories, perpetrated by other armed groups seeking control of these areas. Con- sistent with our interpretation that local social leaders are killed to thwart collective action and mobilization at the municipal level, we show that the targeting of social leaders is not explained by the behavior of the overall homicide rate and that it is exacerbated in municipalities with weaker state capacity and an inefficient local judi- ciary. Our results suggest that partial pacification processes can exacerbate violence by other existing armed groups, aimed at controlling pacified territories.

Suggested Citation

  • Mounu Prem & Andrés F. Rivera & Dario A. Romero & Juan F. Vargas, 2018. "Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace," Documentos de Trabajo 016385, Universidad del Rosario.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000092:016385
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstream/id/8402c40d-e509-4608-ac5c-931f49614d5d/dt218R.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ch, Rafael & Shapiro, Jacob & Steele, Abbey & Vargas, Juan F., 2018. "Endogenous Taxation in Ongoing Internal Conflict: The Case of Colombia," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 996-1015, November.
    2. Joshua D. Angrist & Adriana D. Kugler, 2008. "Rural Windfall or a New Resource Curse? Coca, Income, and Civil Conflict in Colombia," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(2), pages 191-215, May.
    3. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2010. "State Capacity, Conflict, and Development," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 1-34, January.
    4. Doyle, Michael W. & Sambanis, Nicholas, 2000. "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(4), pages 779-801, December.
    5. Melissa Dell, 2015. "Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(6), pages 1738-1779, June.
    6. Michael D. König & Dominic Rohner & Mathias Thoenig & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2017. "Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence From the Great War of Africa," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 1093-1132, July.
    7. Nicola Gennaioli & Ilia Rainer, 2007. "The modern impact of precolonial centralization in Africa," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 185-234, September.
    8. Leopoldo Fergusson & Juan F. Vargas & Mauricio A. Vela, 2013. "Sunlight disinfects? Free media in weak democracies," Documentos de Trabajo 010484, Universidad del Rosario.
    9. Toft, Monica Duffy & Zhukov, Yuri M., 2015. "Islamists and Nationalists: Rebel Motivation and Counterinsurgency in Russia's North Caucasus," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 109(2), pages 222-238, May.
    10. Jorge Restrepo & Michael Spagat & Juan Vargas, 2004. "The Dynamics of the Columbian Civil Conflict: A New Dataset," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 21, pages 396-429.
    11. Alexander B. Downes, 2007. "Restraint or Propellant? Democracy and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(6), pages 872-904, December.
    12. Daron Acemoglu & Camilo García-Jimeno & James A. Robinson, 2015. "State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2364-2409, August.
    13. Acemoglu, Daron, 2005. "Politics and economics in weak and strong states," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1199-1226, October.
    14. Humphreys, Macartan & Weinstein, Jeremy M., 2006. "Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(3), pages 429-447, August.
    15. Eli Berman & Joseph H. Felter & Jacob N. Shapiro & Erin Troland, 2013. "Modest, Secure, and Informed: Successful Development in Conflict Zones," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 512-517, May.
    16. Leopoldo Fergusson & Pablo Querubín & Nelson A. Ruiz & Juan F. Vargas, 2017. "The Real Winner's Curse," Documentos CEDE 015279, Universidad de los Andes - CEDE.
    17. Conley, T. G., 1999. "GMM estimation with cross sectional dependence," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 1-45, September.
    18. Crost, Benjamin & Felter, Joseph H. & Johnston, Patrick B., 2016. "Conditional cash transfers, civil conflict and insurgent influence: Experimental evidence from the Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 171-182.
    19. Matthew Adam Kocher & Thomas B. Pepinsky & Stathis N. Kalyvas, 2011. "Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(2), pages 201-218, April.
    20. Daron Acemoglu & Leopoldo Fergusson & James Robinson & Dario Romero & Juan F. Vargas, 2020. "The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 1-43, August.
    21. Jason Lyall, 2009. "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(3), pages 331-362, June.
    22. Abbey Steele, 2009. "Seeking Safety: Avoiding Displacement and Choosing Destinations in Civil Wars," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 46(3), pages 419-429, May.
    23. Luke N. Condra & Jacob N. Shapiro, 2012. "Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(1), pages 167-187, January.
    24. Yuri M. Zhukov & Toft, Monica Duffy, "undated". "Islamists and Nationalists: Rebel Motivation and Counterinsurgency in Russia?s North Caucasus," Working Paper 221546, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    25. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Rafael J. Santos, 2013. "The Monopoly Of Violence: Evidence From Colombia," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11, pages 5-44, January.
    26. Lyall, Jason & Blair, Graeme & Imai, Kosuke, 2013. "Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 107(4), pages 679-705, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. The Art of Winning a Peace Agreement: The Case of the FARC
      by ? in Political Violence at a Glance on 2019-09-16 12:00:53

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Prem, Mounu & Saavedra, Santiago & Vargas, Juan F., 2020. "End-of-conflict deforestation: Evidence from Colombia’s peace agreement," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    2. Gabriela Rubio, 2020. "¿Fin de la guerra, fin de la violencia? Evidencia del Acuerdo de Paz y homicidios en Colombia," Documentos CEDE 018228, Universidad de los Andes - CEDE.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social leaders; Peace process; Armed conflict; Territorial control;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000092:016385. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Facultad de Economía). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.