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Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace

Author

Listed:
  • Mounu Prem
  • AndrÔøΩs F. Rivera
  • Dario A. Romero
  • Juan F. Vargas

Abstract

We study the unintended consequences of the recent peace process in Colombia, that ended over five decades of internal armed conflict with the FARC insurgency. Using a triple differences empirical strategy, we show that the permanent ceasefire that started in December 2014 in the context of the peace negotiations was followed by an increase in the killing of social leaders in previously FARC-dominated territories, perpetrated by other armed groups seeking control of these areas. Con- sistent with our interpretation that local social leaders are killed to thwart collective action and mobilization at the municipal level, we show that the targeting of social leaders is not explained by the behavior of the overall homicide rate and that it is exacerbated in municipalities with weaker state capacity and an inefficient local judi- ciary. Our results suggest that partial pacification processes can exacerbate violence by other existing armed groups, aimed at controlling pacified territories.

Suggested Citation

  • Mounu Prem & AndrÔøΩs F. Rivera & Dario A. Romero & Juan F. Vargas, 2018. "Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace," Documentos de Trabajo 16385, Universidad del Rosario.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000092:016385
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. The Art of Winning a Peace Agreement: The Case of the FARC
      by ? in Political Violence at a Glance on 2019-09-16 12:00:53

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Knight, Brian & Tribin, Ana, 2023. "Immigration and violent crime: Evidence from the Colombia-Venezuela Border," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    2. Samper, Juan Antonio & Krause, Torsten, 2024. "“We fight to the end”: On the violence against social leaders and territorial defenders during the post-peace agreement period and its political ecological implications in the Putumayo, Colombia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
    3. Leopoldo Fergusson & Pablo Querubin & Nelson A. Ruiz & Juan F. Vargas, 2021. "The Real Winner's Curse," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 52-68, January.
    4. Cantillo, Tatiana & Garza, Nestor, 2022. "Armed conflict, institutions and deforestation: A dynamic spatiotemporal analysis of Colombia 2000–2018," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    5. Lucas Mar√≠n Llanes, 2020. "Unintended Consequences of Alternative Development Programs: Evidence From Colombia's Illegal Crop Substitution," Documentos CEDE 18468, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    6. Prem, Mounu & Saavedra, Santiago & Vargas, Juan F., 2020. "End-of-conflict deforestation: Evidence from Colombia’s peace agreement," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    7. Gabriela Rubio, 2020. "¬øFin de la guerra, fin de la violencia? Evidencia del Acuerdo de Paz y homicidios en Colombia," Documentos CEDE 18228, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    8. Ana Maria Diaz & Luz Magdalena Salas & Ana María Tribín-Uribe, 2020. "Hidden benefits of peace: The case of sexual violence," Borradores de Economia 1124, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    9. Ladino, Juan Felipe & Saavedra, Santiago & Wiesner, Daniel, 2021. "One step ahead of the law: The net effect of anticipation and implementation of Colombia’s illegal crops substitution program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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