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Engineering Informal Institutions: Long-run Impacts of Alternative Dispute Resolution on Violence and Property Rights in Liberia

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  • Alexandra C. Hartman
  • Robert A. Blair
  • Christopher Blattman

Abstract

Informal institutions govern property rights and disputes when formal systems are weak. Well-functioning institutions should help people reach and maintain bargains, minimizing violence. Can outside organizations engineer improvements and reduce violent conflicts? Will this improve property rights and investment? We experimentally evaluate a UN and civil society mass education campaign to promote alternative dispute resolution (ADR) practices and norms in rural communities, where violent land disputes are common. Prior work showed a fall in violence and unresolved disputes within one year. We return after three years to test for sustained impacts and channels. Treated communities report large, sustained falls in violent disputes and a slight shift towards nonviolent norms. Treated residents also report larger farms, though overall effects on property rights and investments are mixed. Politically-connected residents report more secure property rights while those with fewer connections feel less secure. Sustained social engineering is feasible but politics shapes distributional outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexandra C. Hartman & Robert A. Blair & Christopher Blattman, 2018. "Engineering Informal Institutions: Long-run Impacts of Alternative Dispute Resolution on Violence and Property Rights in Liberia," NBER Working Papers 24482, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24482
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hannah M. Smidt, 2020. "United Nations Peacekeeping Locally: Enabling Conflict Resolution, Reducing Communal Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 64(2-3), pages 344-372, February.
    2. Mounu Prem & Andrés F. Rivera & Dario A. Romero & Juan F. Vargas, 2018. "Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace," Documentos de Trabajo 16385, Universidad del Rosario.
    3. Dyer, Julian, 2023. "The fruits (and vegetables) of crime: Protection from theft and agricultural development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    4. Blair, Robert A. & Karim, Sabrina M. & Morse, Benjamin S., 2019. "Establishing the Rule of Law in Weak and War-torn States: Evidence from a Field Experiment with the Liberian National Police," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(3), pages 641-657, August.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

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