Interlinkage, limited liability, and strategic interaction
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- Basu, Kaushik & Bell, Clive & Bose, Pinaki, 2000. "Interlinkage, limited liability and strategic interaction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 445-462, August.
References listed on IDEAS
- Bell, Clive, 1988. "Credit markets and interlinked transactions," Handbook of Development Economics,in: Hollis Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 763-830 Elsevier.
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- Sen, Debapriya, 2011.
"A theory of sharecropping: The role of price behavior and imperfect competition,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 181-199.
- Sen, Debapriya, 2009. "A theory of sharecropping: the role of price behavior and imperfect competition," MPRA Paper 14898, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sen, Debapriya, 2009. "A theory of sharecropping: the role of price behavior and imperfect competition," MPRA Paper 19021, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Debapriya Sen, 2005. "Sharecropping, interlinkage, and price variation," Department of Economics Working Papers 05-10, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
- Kumar, Sunil Mitra, 2013. "Does Access to Formal Agricultural Credit Depend on Caste?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 315-328.
- Mansuri, Ghazala, 2007. "Credit layering in informal financial markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 715-730, November.
- Lefèvre, Mélanie & Tharakan, Joe, 2011.
"Intermediaries, transport costs and interlinked transactions,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
8615, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- LEFÈVRE, Mélanie & THARAKAN, Joe & ,, 2013. "Intermediaries, transport costs and interlinked transactions," CORE Discussion Papers 2013055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Pasquale Commendatore & Martin Currie, 2006.
"A Dynamical Analysis Of Alternative Forms Of Agricultural Land Tenure,"
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 443-463, November.
- EP Commendatore & M Currie, 2002. "A Dynamical Analysis of Alternative Forms of Agricultural Land Tenure," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0201, Economics, The University of Manchester.
More about this item
KeywordsLabor Policies; Environmental Economics&Policies; Payment Systems&Infrastructure; Economic Theory&Research; Health Economics&Finance; Urban Housing; Banks&Banking Reform; Health Economics&Finance; Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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