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De Turgot à la nouvelle économie institutionnelle. Brève revue des théories économiques du métayage

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  • Colin, Jean-Philippe

Abstract

In an evolutionary approach, classical economists understood sharecropping as a tenancy system imposed mainly by tenants' capital constraints. Later, the orthodox neoclassical economics has not been able to offer a satisfactory explanation of sharecropping. Since two decades, New Institutional economists have been analyzing the economic rationality of sharecropping in terms of risk, imperfect markets, asymmetrical information, and transaction costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Colin, Jean-Philippe, 1995. "De Turgot à la nouvelle économie institutionnelle. Brève revue des théories économiques du métayage," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 228.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ersfer:354219
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.354219
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    References listed on IDEAS

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