Share Contracts and Unobserved Ability
We present a model with a monopolistic landlord and tenants with unobservable ability. In this setting, the landlord should use a wage contract to extract the full surplus due to ability since a share or fixed rent contract leaves some of the surplus in the hands of the tenants. We combine this issue with a standard moral hazard problem on the tenants' side, which argues for a fixed rent contract. A share contract is an optimal compromise between these two forces.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2001|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 6 East 16th Street, New York, NY 10003|
Web page: http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Reid, Joseph D, Jr, 1976. " Sharecropping and Agricultural Uncertainty," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 549-576, April.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974.
"Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1973. "Incentives and Risk-Sharing in Sharecropping," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 353, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Franklin Allen, 1982. "On Share Contracts and Screening," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 541-547, Autumn.
- William Hallagan, 1978. "Self-Selection by Contractual Choice and the Theory of Sharecropping," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 344-354, Autumn.
- Basu, Kaushik, 1992. "Limited liability and the existence of share tenancy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 203-220, January.
- Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1985. "A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 352-367, June.
- Muthoo, Abhinay, 1998. "Renegotiation-proof tenurial contracts as screening mechanisms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-26, June. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:epa:cepawp:2001-03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bridget Fisher)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.