Non-agricultural land use and land reform: theory and evidence from Brazil
This paper examines the effect of nonagricultural land use on agrarian organization and land reform, providing a simple model to determine its policy implications and some evidence on its importance. It is argued that, if land-rental market is imperfect, there is a role for redistributive land policies and the following implications hold: (i) land reform is more probable to enhance efficiency in a low-wage economy; (ii) such policies should aim small farmers instead of landless people, obtaining land from large landholders. Empirical evidence suggests this is a relevant issue in Brazil, specially during periods of high macroeconomic instability.
|Length:||21p. JEL Code: O13, Q15, Q24|
|Date of creation:||Feb 2005|
|Date of revision:|
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