IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/ecdecc/v56y2008p851-870.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rural Organization and Land Reform in Brazil: The Role of Nonagricultural Benefits of Landholding

Author

Listed:
  • Juliano J. Assunção

Abstract

This article examines the effects of nonagricultural land use on agrarian organization and land reform in an economy characterized by limited credit and land rental markets. The nonagricultural demand for land, under credit constraint, generates a potential mismatch between the distribution of land and the distribution of farming skills. This disparity reduces the agricultural output if the land rental market is absent. A perfect land rental market is shown to determine the highest possible agricultural output. Policy implications from the model include, in addition to market improvements, the fact that small farmers rather than landless people should be the target of redistributive land reform programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Juliano J. Assunção, 2008. "Rural Organization and Land Reform in Brazil: The Role of Nonagricultural Benefits of Landholding," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56, pages 851-870.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:v:56:y:2008:p:851-870
    DOI: 10.1086/588167
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/588167
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
    2. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2000. "Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and Growth: Evidence from India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(2), pages 389-430.
    3. Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, 1993. "Income Distribution and Macroeconomics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 35-52.
    4. William Hallagan, 1978. "Self-Selection by Contractual Choice and the Theory of Sharecropping," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 344-354, Autumn.
    5. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Paul J. Gertler & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2002. "Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 239-280, April.
    6. Hans P. Binswanger & Klaus Deininger, 1997. "Explaining Agricultural and Agrarian Policies in Developing Countries," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(4), pages 1958-2005, December.
    7. Shetty, Sudhir, 1988. "Limited liability, wealth differences and tenancy contracts in agrarian economies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-22, July.
    8. Franklin Allen, 1982. "On Share Contracts and Screening," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 541-547, Autumn.
    9. Assuncao, Juliano J. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2003. "Can unobserved heterogeneity in farmer ability explain the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 189-194, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:v:56:y:2008:p:851-870. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division). General contact details of provider: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/EDCC/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.