IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v110y2002i2p239-280.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal

Author

Listed:
  • Abhijit V. Banerjee
  • Paul J. Gertler
  • Maitreesh Ghatak

Abstract

The paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity. Theoretically, the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects: a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect. Analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the Indian state of West Bengal in the late 1970s suggests that tenancy reform had a positive effect on agricultural productivity there.

Suggested Citation

  • Abhijit V. Banerjee & Paul J. Gertler & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2002. "Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 239-280, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:2:p:239-280
    DOI: 10.1086/338744
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/338744
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/338744?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dilip Mookherjee & Debraj Ray, 2002. "Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 818-849, September.
    2. Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1985. "A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 352-367, June.
    3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Mohamed Salah Matoussi, 1995. "Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and Sharecropping in El Oulja," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(3), pages 381-399.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
    5. D. Gale Johnson, 1950. "Resource Allocation under Share Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 111-111.
    6. Rawal, Vikas, 2001. "Agrarian Reform and Land Markets: A Study of Land Transactions in Two Villages of West Bengal, 1977-1995," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(3), pages 611-629, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jacoby, Hanan G. & Mansuri, Ghazala, 2009. "Incentives, supervision, and sharecropper productivity," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 232-241, March.
    2. Sen, Debapriya, 2011. "A theory of sharecropping: The role of price behavior and imperfect competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 181-199.
    3. Dubois, Pierre, 2002. "Moral hazard, land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 35-64, June.
    4. Benin, Samuel & Place, Frank & Nkonya, Ephraim M. & Pender, John L., 2006. "Land Markets and Agricultural Land Use Efficiency and Sustainability: Evidence from East Africa," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25645, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    5. Raul V. Fabella, 2016. "Why Fixed Rent Contracts are Less Prevalent: Weak Third Party Enforcement and Endogenous Principal Type," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201606, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
    6. Mukhamedova, Nozilakhon & Pomfret, Richard, 2019. "Why does sharecropping survive? Agrarian institutions and contract choice in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 576-597.
    7. Nozilakhon Mukhamedova & Richard Pomfret, 2019. "Why Does Sharecropping Survive? Agrarian Institutions and Contract Choice in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 61(4), pages 576-597, December.
    8. Juliano Junqueira Assunção, 2005. "Non-agricultural land use and land reform: theory and evidence from Brazil," Textos para discussão 496, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
    9. Pedro Mendi, 2005. "The Structure of Payments in Technology Transfer Contracts: Evidence from Spain," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 403-429, June.
    10. M. A. Taslim, 1992. "A Survey of Theories of Cropshare Tenancy," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 68(3), pages 254-275, September.
    11. Bidisha, Sayema Haque & Hossain, Md. Amzad & Alam, Rubaiyat & Hasan, Md. Mehedi, 2018. "Credit, tenancy choice and agricultural efficiency: Evidence from the northern region of Bangladesh," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 22-32.
    12. Oriana Bandiera, 1999. "On the Structure of Tenancy contracts: Theory and Evidence fron 19th Century Rural Sicily," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    13. Huffman, Wallace E & Just, Richard E, 2004. "Implications of Agency Theory for Optimal Land Tenure Contracts," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(3), pages 617-642, April.
    14. Ananish Chaudhuri & Pushkar Maitra, 1997. "Determinants of Land Tenure Contracts; Theory and Evidence from Rural India," Departmental Working Papers 199710, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    15. Nicolas Quérou & Antoine Soubeyran & Raphael Soubeyran, 2015. "Moral hazard and capability," Working Papers hal-02795218, HAL.
    16. Luis H. B. Braido, 2008. "Evidence on the Incentive Properties of Share Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(2), pages 327-349, May.
    17. Banerjee, Abhijit V. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2004. "Eviction threats and investment incentives," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 469-488, August.
    18. Riekhof, Marie-Catherine, 2019. "The insurance premium in the interest rates of interlinked loans in a small-scale fishery," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 87-112, February.
    19. Jellal, Mohamed & Zenou, Yves, 2005. "Ethnic Diversity, Market Structure and Risk Sharing in Developing Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 5366, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:2:p:239-280. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.