IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Renegotiation-proof tenurial contracts as screening mechanisms


  • Muthoo, Abhinay


No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Muthoo, Abhinay, 1998. "Renegotiation-proof tenurial contracts as screening mechanisms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-26, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:56:y:1998:i:1:p:1-26

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. D.J. Brown & J.H. Atkinson, 1981. "Cash and Share Renting: An Empirical Test of the Link Between Entrepreneurial Ability and Contractual Choice," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 296-299, Spring.
    2. Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1985. "A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 352-367, June.
    3. William Hallagan, 1978. "Self-Selection by Contractual Choice and the Theory of Sharecropping," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 344-354, Autumn.
    4. Allen, Franklin, 1985. "On the Fixed Nature of Sharecropping Contracts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(377), pages 30-48, March.
    5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-924, July.
    6. Baron, David P. & Besanko, David, 1984. "Regulation and information in a continuing relationship," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 267-302.
    7. Basu, Kaushik, 1992. "Limited liability and the existence of share tenancy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 203-220, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Sen, Debapriya, 2011. "A theory of sharecropping: The role of price behavior and imperfect competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 181-199.
    2. Debapriya Sen, 2005. "Sharecropping, interlinkage, and price variation," Department of Economics Working Papers 05-10, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    3. Lanjouw, Jean Olson, 1999. "Information and the operation of markets: tests based on a general equilibrium model of land leasing in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 497-527, December.
    4. Eugene Canjels & Ute Volz, 2001. "Share Contracts and Unobserved Ability," SCEPA working paper series. SCEPA's main areas of research are macroeconomic policy, inequality and poverty, and globalization. 2001-03, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA), The New School.
    5. Briones, Roehlano M., 2000. "Property Rights Reform in Philippine Agriculture: Framework for Analysis and Review of Recent Experience," Discussion Papers DP 2000-29, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
    6. Raul V. Fabella, 2016. "Why Fixed Rent Contracts are Less Prevalent: Weak Third Party Enforcement and Endogenous Principal Type," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201606, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
    7. Jaideep Roy & Konstantinos Serfes, 2000. "Strategic Choice of Contract Lengths in Agriculture," Department of Economics Working Papers 00-03, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    8. Roy, Jaideep & Serfes, Konstantinos, 2001. "Intertemporal discounting and tenurial contracts," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 417-436, April.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:56:y:1998:i:1:p:1-26. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.