Risk Aversion as Effort Incentive: A Correction and Prima Facie Test of the Moral Hazard Theory of Share Tenancity
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References listed on IDEAS
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- James Roumasset, 2004.
"Rural Institutions, Agricultural Development, and Pro-Poor Economic Growth,"
Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA), vol. 1(1), pages 61-82, June.
- Roumasset, James, 2004. "Rural Institutions, Agricultural Development, and Pro-Poor Economic Growth," Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA), vol. 1(1), pages 1-20, June.
- James Andreoni & Deniz Aydin & Blake Barton & B. Douglas Bernheim & Jeffrey Naecker, 2020.
"When Fair Isn’t Fair: Understanding Choice Reversals Involving Social Preferences,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(5), pages 1673-1711.
- James Andreoni & Deniz Aydin & Blake Barton & B. Douglas Bernheim & Jeffrey Naecker, 2018. "When Fair Isn't Fair: Understanding Choice Reversals Involving Social Preferences," NBER Working Papers 25257, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James Andreoni, 2007. "Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001459, UCLA Department of Economics.
- James Roumasset, 2006. "The Economics of Agricultural Development: What Have We Learned? Processes," Working Papers 200604, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
- James Andreoni & B. Douglas Bernheim, 2009.
"Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(5), pages 1607-1636, September.
- James Andreoni & B. Douglas Bernheim, 2007. "Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects," Discussion Papers 07-030, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
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